#title Father Land
#subtitle A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family
#author Bertram Schaffner, M.D.
#authors Bertram Schaffner, Margaret Mead, David M. Levy,
#date 1948
#source <[[https://archive.org/details/fatherlandstudyo0000bert][www.archive.org/details/fatherlandstudyo0000bert]]>
#lang en
#pubdate 2026-02-09T02:21:31
#topics psychology, fascism, authoritarian personality, authoritarianism,
#cover b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-15.jpg
#publisher Columbia University Press
*** Synopsis | ~~
This is a pioneering work in the study of national psychology by the use of psychiatric and anthropological methods — a report on the contemporary German character which examines the familial origin of German authoritarianism.
The author, neuropsychiatrist assigned as U. S. member of the International Medical Commission to determine the fitness of Krupp to stand trial, also served with the Information Control Screening Division of the American Military Government in Germany, where he performed psychiatric examinations, and directed psychological tests, studies, and opinion surveys among the German people.
Father Land concentrates on answering the question: What makes Germany authoritarian? The author attempts to find the answer in the patterns of German culture as they are expressed in the German family.
In addition to his own skillful analyses and summaries of findings, Dr. Schaffner presents the text of questionnaires answered by the German applicants, five case histories typical of the five groups into which candidates were screened, and a description of the operation of the screening center. The material amply documents his conclusion that de-Nazification alone will not produce a democratic Germany, but that a complete re-education is needed, beginning in the family circle.
*** Title Page
**Father Land**
When we were young, we had terrific respect for our father. We feared him more than we loved him. One time he told me to jump off a wood-pile where I was playing. I didn’t do it right away, so he called out to me again to jump. This time I did, but I sprained my foot when I fell. When my father came over to me, he slapped my face. He was strict; he loved us but he could not show it. I imagine it was his male modesty. The grandchildren were the only ones he could show love to.On this question of corporal punishment, the responses in the political attitudes test reveal prevailing opinion in favor of not sparing the rod. The sentence, If the father uses no corporal punishment on his children ... , was completed in 60 percent of all cases with answers consistent with the major cultural pattern. Of the men who were cleared politically, 57 percent gave answers of this type, while of those who were refused licenses on political grounds 77 percent favored corporal punishment. Among the majority of such responses were the following: 1. he will make his children soft. That is, corporal punishment is a deliberate method used to develop in the child the toughness which is part of the German manly ideal. 2. the child will punish the father some day. 3. he fails to do his duty while the children are small. 4. he is not interested in his children. Response 4 was a very frequent answer. 5. he may lose authority. Corporal punishment must be used up to a certain limit. Respect for authority is seen to be based upon experience of superior force rather than of desirable personal or intellectual qualities in the father. 6. once in a while he might perhaps be successful. 7. then the mother should not use it either. Number 7 is a restatement of the usage that the father and mother should always be in agreement. 8. he will usually be making a mistake. 9. the children will consider him weak and not respect him. 10. he has, or should have, some good reason for not using it. Maybe he can achieve what he wants through love and kindness. 11. either the children are already well trained or the father makes a mistake in cases where children refuse to obey. That is, the father is able to withhold corporal punishment only because he has already used it in the past and it is therefore no longer necessary. 12. he may have a momentary appearance of success, and will have to work harder later to achieve the goal of his training. 13. he either has ideally good children, or he is no educator. The latter is a completely skeptical reaction, to the absence of corporal punishment. Among the less common responses were these: 1. he is a good pedagogue. Corporal punishment is never the right way to bring up a child. 2. there would soon be no more blind obedience of the military type; free men could develop. 3. he has to be both wise and patient. 4. he avoids a method which can damage a child’s soul severely. It works better without striking. 5. he has recognized that corporal punishment is not a method of education. 6. he uses reasonable principles; there are other punishments, which hurt just as much. Generally one cannot spank anything into a child. 7. then he doesn’t train his children to roughness and cruelty. 8. if his training is consistent, he won’t need corporal punishment. 9. education proceeds better, and no regimented puppets result. It is a goal of family life to have trained one’s children to implicit obedience by the age of five. That this standard is shared not only by adults but by younger people as well was found in the answers to this thesis: Children should blindly obey the laws and orders established for adults. Of the entire group questioned, 54 percent responded Yes and 42 percent No; in Berlin, those answering Yes were 60 percent of the total, the dissenters 39 percent. Among the 17–27 year old group in Baden-Wurttemberg, 56 Percent approved and 40 percent did not. Among the not quite representative group of students at Marburg University, 43 percent agreed with the statement, while 53 percent disapproved. It is less significant that opinion was so nearly divided than that so large a percentage of each group actually approved the principle of blind obedience. A German father is not concerned with the question whether his children love him. He prefers their respect (Ehrfurcht). Love is an emotion reserved for other relationships, for example, a son’s feeling for his mother or a mother’s emotions about her children. It is a word that he may use in describing his feelings for his wife, but in a sense quite different from that of romantic love. From his point of view, it would be unmanly to be governed by considerations of love in dealings with his children. He prefers his children to have feelings of awe, admiration, confidence, and fear for him. He trusts this Ehrjurcht as an instrument of education far more than love. He rarely embraces or fondles his children, and certainly not after the fifth or sixth year. Though he works for and worries and frets over them, may make toys for them and give them presents, he is not ordinarily demonstrative with them. He spends much time with his children, partly because he enjoys the feeling of being a family man, but also because he feels it his duty to keep very close watch over them. Characteristically he spends all his free time on Sundays with them, taking them for long walks into the country. All of the members of the family usually take their vacation together. But on these occasions, the father does not relinquish his status as head of the family, nor does he relax his aloofness or run the risk of lowering himself to the level of his son. He may invite confidences from his son, because he feels it is his right to know all about his son’s activities and to supervise them; but he cannot reciprocate lest he reveal his own limitations, his indecisions or his inner conflicts and thereby damage the son’s concept of him as an all-knowing, perfect father. In two families I knew, the parent-child relationship was so formal that the children actually used the formal Sie instead of the intimate Du in addressing the mother and father. This fear of intimacy and of demonstration of affection applies equally to the heads of the family. It is accepted that the love of a mother for her children will be one of greater intensity and that she will embrace and fondle children still in their infancy, especially in her function as protector. But the children themselves are led to end such demonstration of affection as early as possible. In later life, they protest that though it did occur, they got away from it before the age of six. This applies not only to behavior between parents and children in front of strangers, but also within the privacy of the home. Completed sentences in the political attitudes test brought out this tendency very well. To the incomplete sentence The demonstration of a mothers feeling for her children through kissing and hugging is ... , 42 percent of the entire group gave replies like the following: 1. not hygienic, and perhaps not good training, though natural. The association of kissing with disease is related both to the general emphasis upon cleanliness and to cultural prohibitions against softness and sentimentality. 2. in most cases not welcomed by children. 3. not to be used too frequently, and it can be onesided. There must be restraint in education, especially when as at present in Germany, the authority of the father is absent. Number 3 is the reply of a woman whose husband was “missing in action.” 4. exaggerated tenderness with children is dangerous, because it hinders them from developing their own tenderness. In this answer, hugging and kissing are treated as unnecessary exaggerations of maternal tenderness, which Germans feel can be shown and felt without physical manifestation. There is a fear that too much of it will affect a child’s emotional development. 5. the overindulgent kind of love (Affenliebe) which often defeats its own purpose. 6. understandable, but should be held back. The latter reply is testimonial to the suppression of spontaneous feelings which parents must exercise. It is in keeping with the wider cultural ideal of self-control (Selbstbeherrschung). 7. not unnatural, but should be restrained, especially when the mother is sick. 8. an animal instinct, an expression of love and worry. Comparing human behavior with animal instincts is considered especially uncomplimentary in Germany. 9. not to be encouraged to excess. 10. a natural occurrence with analogies in the animal world. 11. the abreaction of exotic feelings. In Number 11, no doubt “erotic” was the word intended. 12. unpleasant to witness. 13. quite nice when not overdone, but it tends to make children arrogant and domineering. 14. not always appropriate, especially when the children themselves have an aversion to physical tenderness. 15. often a reaction to previous strictness. 16. will remain, probably, in spite of aesthetic objections. It may be significant that while 41 percent of the politically acceptable candidates gave replies of this type, 61 percent of the candidates with incriminating political records opposed the demonstration of maternal affection through hugging and kissing- Among the replies there were the following which speak for a less traditional German behavior pattern: 1. a part of human nature. 2. a sign of tenderness and love. 3. a heartfelt, natural thing, unless it becomes a mere external habit. 4. the noblest, most inexpressible thing that a human being experiences in life. 5. the expression of union and overflowing love. The marked difference between the cold rejection of demonstrated affection in the former replies, and the unrestrained praise of maternal love in the latter, is another common finding. It became apparent in the interviews that Germans tend to take up extreme positions rather than to adopt intermediate, moderate points of view. Interestingly enough, the same individual may show such polarity internally, possessing two widely divergent points of view. As a result he can swing from one extreme to the other, depending upon external pressures and considerations of status, with little feeling of inconsistency. This may explain certain contradictions in behavior, such as being either very obsequious or very arrogant, as well as the paradox that peaceful Germans who lovingly tend their flower gardens and their homes also believe in strict military training and periodically resort to war. A good example of the latter was Heinrich Himmler, who organized concentration camps for the National Socialist regime and planned the extermination of millions, yet had the reputation among his countrymen of being “a good family man, home-loving and tender toward children.” This duality is also seen when one compares the extravagant expressions of love for the mother with the known restrained relationship with the father, in which even the admission of emotion is inhibited. One of the corollaries of the father’s position as head of the family is that his relationship with the other members remains rather impersonal. This applies not only to his behavior toward his children, but toward his wife as well. The common relationship between husband and wife is not based upon romantic love as we know it in the United States. Although German marriages are not arranged as strictly as in France or Spain, they are more likely than not to be strongly influenced by consideration of the parents’ wishes and by social-economic conditions. The approval or disapproval of the parents plays a much larger role in the selection of a future mate than in the United States. A marriage in Germany is not often the spontaneous, highly charged emotional experience that most Americans have in mind. The choice of the actual partner may be made by the parties involved, but the circle of selection is limited and controlled by parental and other social considerations. Crossing of class and religious lines is frowned upon, and the parent feels entitled to disapprove or forbid such a step. Their child will not, in most cases, insist upon the right to marry in the face of parental opposition. If the child should insist or elope, the parents may break off all relations with the disobedient child. This state of affairs, in which parents and children do not speak to one another for months or years, may persist until the first baby is born. Most American parents would feel that love is a personal matter which each person must be allowed to decide for himself, or that, once a mistake has been made, it is the duty of loving parents to help the erring child. German parents, however, resent the insult to their authority and act the part of the injured and ignored. Stories of fathers who banish their offspring from the home are not uncommon. Screening Center candidates spoke of brothers who had refused to comply with parental standards and were ordered to “go to America.” The whereabouts of the “black sheep” were generally unknown because the father refused to allow other members of the family to communicate with them. In some cases, the mother kept up a clandestine correspondence, in which she was more or less abetted by the other children, who did not dare to oppose their father openly. In most of these cases, one gathered that the father could not tolerate the insult to his authority, and rather than admit a defect in the rearing of his child, expelled the child from the family circle. The offenses were not always major, sometimes only a matter of petty theft or refusal to work on the father’s land. The requirement of parental consent to marriage can hardly be disregarded as of little importance, because of the custom of the dowry (Mitgift), which has persisted up to the present time, especially among the middle and upper classes. The wife’s father is still expected to give a handsome sum of money to his future son-in-law. Naturally he prefers to give it to someone of whom he has approved. This is usually someone already established or well-to-do, or of a social status equal or superior to that of the parents. The dowry likewise influences the decision of the prospective son-in-law in his choice of a bride, but its chief effect is that her parents can hinder the marriage or even render it impossible by withholding the dowry. Class differences in the matter of the dowry exist, but commonly the parents retain a very large measure of power over the marriage plans of their daughters through this control of the dowry. Among the aristocracy, the father is expected to present to his future son-in-law, a tract of land of a size appropriate to the older man’s rank and fortune. The wealthy industrialist gives considerable sums of money with his daughter’s hand. In the middle classes, professional men and businessmen make great efforts to raise a large dowry so as to insure a “good marriage,” even gathering money from relatives outside the immediate family. There is said to be less emphasis on the size of the dowry in Beamten circles, where personal prestige as a public official compensates for the lower financial status. Middle-class parents are especially prudent about the marriage of a daughter and attempt to retain complete control over her selection of a marriage partner. Some German observers believe that the parents’ delay of the daughter’s marriage until a sufficiently large dowry is accumulated, or until a fitting husband can be found, causes the middle-class daughter to accept extramarital sex relations in lieu of an overdelayed marriage for which she is unwilling to wait. Among peasants, the father often gives cows or other animals to the prospective bridegroom. If he cannot provide animals, he offers land or tries to gather up some money. In certain sections of Bavaria, he is compelled by law to provide his daughter with a dowry. If the father is dead, the obligation devolves upon the girl’s brothers. In poorer families, the dowry may consist of the girl’s own handiwork, for example, clothing and household effects. Even so, the father may still behave as if he owned it, with the right to dispose of it as he sees fit. Only in the lower urban classes, where the father cannot amass sums of money or make gifts of cattle or land, and a girl employed in industry cannot easily provide her own Mitgift, is the dowry disappearing, the parents thereby losing much of their control over their daughter’s marriage. Moreover, a girl working and earning her own living is in a better position to be relatively independent of her parents. In this way, industrialization undermines the traditional authoritarian position of the father.[9] After marriage, control of the dowry usually passes entirely into the hands of the husband, unless otherwise stated in the marriage contract. This operates to destroy whatever financial and personal independence a wife might expect to have if the money remained in her possession. The dowry and the contract make of the marriage a formal, legally transacted relationship, rather than a free romantic union. Two human beings agree to live together, produce children, and make a home for them. The husband guarantees to support them to the best of his ability, to provide food, shelter and clothing, and to guide the education of his offspring. He will try to preserve, or even to raise, their social status. In the traditional relationship, the man is and must remain the more important of the marriage partners. He wields the authority, and his wife must comply with his ideas. His happiness and his will come before hers. To a large degree she must be as passive and compliant to her husband as are her children. She is expected to keep the house clean and in running order, to cook or to see that the food is prepared, to bear children, to be her husband’s companion when he desires it, and to carry out his orders for the children’s education. “Love” is not a primary requisite. A man is assumed to be fond of a woman if he asks her hand in marriage, but he need not avow eternal love, or make the statement that he is “head over heels in love”; this would hurt his masculine pride. He promises support and devotion; love is a secondary consideration. The love poems and sentimental Lieder are not necessarily connected with marriage. They are part of the romantic experiences of the “Sturm und Drang” period in adolescence, when they are expected and tolerated, and they are often rejected in later life. [9] Personal communication from Dr. Ruth Benedict, Department of Anthropology, Columbia University. It is interesting to note in this connection that Germans have only one word to express the different types of love. They find it verbally difficult to distinguish between romantic love, erotic love, filial love, and love-making. This was well brought out at the Screening Center, when several candidates, glancing through American newspapers, expressed shock at the frequency with which the word was used in publications that reached all members of the family, as in German, Liebe is most frequently associated with erotic love. It was also difficult for them to understand the preoccupation of most Americans with the psychological complications of the love relationship. Since the problem does not exist for the German husband, who does not have to demonstrate his sentiments except by the physical support which he provides or by his presence in the family, he does not grasp the full implications and connotations of the term “love” as used in other cultures. He believes that he should praise his wife, partly for work well done and partly to help maintain the children’s respect for her. He would consider hugging or embracing her, especially in front of the children, improper and effeminate, and a poor example for the children, whose minds should be on other things. He does not feel that such demonstrations of affection are necessary to insure his wife’s devotion; that is presumed to be automatic in her position within the family. A wife who is not devoted to her husband shows lack of respect for him. He believes in his right to scold or to punish her when she is at fault, and will not tolerate any argument about it from her. He believes in his right to determine what is right and wrong for her as his wife. Germans on the whole are not shocked to hear that a husband has struck his wife “because she was disobedient.” The word obey in the wedding ceremony, which young American brides prefer to omit, is an integral part of the German woman’s obligation to her husband, and one which he takes literally. The wife is not an equal in the home; the husband expects service, obedience, and loyalty from her. Romantic love would be hard for a German husband to accept, because it would tend to raise his wife to his own hierarchical level. That he is not expected to treat his wife as his equal or his partner in the rearing of their children is demonstrated by completions in another part of the political attitudes test. When the candidates were asked to complete this sentence A mother, who interferes (dazwischen tritt) when a father is punishing his son, is 70 percent answered in the following way: 1. a poor wife; she should be completely in agreement with the educational methods of her husband. 2. not practical, and not smart. 3. not a good educator. That is, she is either interrupting the training process itself, or does not understand the aims of a German education. 4. dumb, because she undermines the father’s authority. 5. harming the father. 6. understandable, but not correct. 7. dumb; she makes her son a sissy. 8. overwhelmed by primitive instincts. Number 8 is further reference to affection and maternal feeling as instincts which must be strictly controlled if not altogether suppressed. 9. not to be condemned too harshly, as women can decide things only by feelings and emotions. 10. weak; she defeats the purpose of child-training. 11. not adapted to married life. 12. stupid; dualism in the education of a child is harmful to his soul. 13. not suited to train children. 14. overwhelmed by her love for her child, so that she cannot see the necessity for punishment or for preserving the influence of the father. It is most significant that, whereas Americans would tend to answer the problem in terms of the propriety of quarreling before one’s children, or a mother’s right to protect her child from possible violence by the father, Germans responded in terms of the threatened injury to the father’s status or the effects of a possible interruption of an abstract conception of childtraining. Seventy percent of the candidates felt that in one way or another she was transgressing an unwritten law. The last answer in this group was: 15. stupid, even when she knows that the father is wrong. The following replies occurred in less than 30 percent of the cases: 1. not to be utterly damned. 2. the right kind of mother. 3. exhibiting a natural feeling. 4. an opponent of extreme hardness. 5. a true mother, especially if the father punishes when he is excited. 6. unusually protective; she probably means well. 7. wiser than a mother who leaves things just as they are to protect the father’s authority. 8. unwise, though possibly juster than the father. 9. democratically minded; children should develop freely. 10. within her rights; a wife should have at least half, if not more, of the share in the child’s training. There was no significant difference on this subject among Germans of differing political orientation, confirming the widespread acceptance of the thesis that women should bow to the authority of the husband within the home. It is somewhat surprising that the results did not reveal greater divergence, since Germans also believe that the mother, not the father, is primarily responsible for the early upbringing of the child, that is, up to the age of five. The responses may indicate that even in the infancy of the child, the father is the final authority and has the right to interfere with the mother’s methods, whereas she never has the right to interfere with his. There are exceptions to this general code of behavior. In his relationship with his grandchildren, a German may be freer and more indulgent than with his own children; he behaves more like the American father, and is more relaxed, reciprocal, and joyful. Possibly this is due to the fact that he is not responsible for the education of his grandchildren; he depends on his son to be the stern father and an example to them. He can afford to be casual and easygoing because his own ego and family status are not so directly involved. For the same reason, he may have an easy, nonauthoritarian relationship with his nephews. The strong bond of emotion between the mother and her sons, outstanding in the German culture, frequently has its counterpart in an intense feeling between father and daughter; in such cases, the father is more indulgent with his daughter than he would allow himself to be with his son. In any case, he is much more concerned with the outcome of his training of his son than with that of his daughter. ** The German Mother The position of the German mother, in contrast to that in some other cultures, is secondary in the family. This is due to two chief factors: her subjugation to the undisputed authority of the father, and her abandonment of those qualities associated with “femininity” which would make her a colorful, self-reliant personality instead of an insecure passive drudge. She is completely dependent on her husband. The German woman is not the mistress of her own household, except in the kitchen and nursery; she may actually exclude men from these restricted areas, but her house remains essentially a man’s domain. She has unquestioned authority over the maids and the nurses, because they are of lower social status than she and because they function inside her allotted departments. But what authority she has over her own children she has only as the representative of the father and in his absence. When he is in the home, she herself falls under his jurisdiction; she is on a level with the children, distinguished from them only by her superiority in age. When he is out, she wields authority in his name, subject to his approval or disapproval on his return; there is, of course, no guarantee that he will support her decisions. Maintaining her position with the children is of less importance to him than asserting his own authority. He may punish the children severely for disobedience while he was away, and at the same time severely rebuke the mother for her failure to maintain discipline. Corporal punishment is inflicted less often by the mother than by the father, but she may resort to it, nevertheless. She may exact implicit obedience, for she herself has been brought up to obey all orders promptly and completely. But the child does not accept corporal punishment from her as readily and naturally as from his father. When she slaps or spanks him, he is more likely to feel “hurt,” thinking that his love for her has been betrayed.[10] The latter is especially the case when the mother reports an infringement of discipline to the father. [10] Gregory Bateson, “Analysis of the Nazi Film ‘Hitlerjunge Quex,’ ” 1942; unpublished manuscript, Institute for Intercultural Studies, American Museum of Natural History, New York City. This makes the status of the mother, in the eyes of the children, a variable and indefinite one. At one time they may be afraid of her delegated authority; at another, they are full of sympathy for her and share her fear of the father. It becomes hard for them to rely on her completely, and they may develop resentments because she has “betrayed” them to the father. Thus a woman’s relationship to her children and her status within her home are variable and insecure. There can be only one authority in the home (the father) and only one court of appeal. The woman has essentially a child’s status, and the children sense it. Her adjustment in her marriage depends on the degree to which she complies with the standards and demands of her husband; the most frequent solution is to identify herself as completely as possible with him in order to minimize the chances of friction. This tendency to comply, to submerge her own individuality rather than to rebel or to maintain her independence, is of course what the German husband desires. The German woman’s married life is more successful if she allows her emotional adjustment to her husband to take precedence over her relationship to her children. Thus, the authoritarian position of the father automatically weakens the ties between a mother and her children, and increases the dependence of both upon the central father-figure. The mother, whose marriage relationship may provide her with no more than physical security and a routine life of service and association with her husband, is likely to direct the greater part of her feeling and affection toward her children. The care and training of the children are almost entirely in her hands for the first five years. Thereafter they are considered to have reached the “age of reason” and come more directly under the attention and the supervision of the father. But the mother can compete for the children’s favor in her own way. The father’s influence is based upon authority, hers upon the affection which she can introduce into the relationship.[11] She maintains her hold upon them, not by virtue of fear or respect, but by “mother-love,” the strongest emotional tie within the German family, and possibly the strongest emotion Germans normally feel, to judge from the amount of poetry they write about it. The mother teaches her children to be grateful to her for the sacrifices she makes for them. She teaches them to measure her goodness as a mother by the number of personal services she provides for them before thinking of herself. The intensity of children’s love for the mother may also be due to the fact that it is the only condoned form of emotional expression in an otherwise austere family life. Thus the German mother is, in a certain sense, a rival of the father for the affection, gratitude, and devotion of their children. The father’s status within the home is partially threatened by his wife’s hold upon the children, and it intensifies his insistence upon their respect for him. He must minimize the importance or wisdom of women and insist upon his wife’s subordination to himself in order to maintain his position of superiority. The adjusted German child accepts such a relationship as the natural order of things; the child in whose family the word of the mother counts as much or more than that of the father may find himself poorly adjusted to the rest of German society, which is based upon the superior status of men (unless his mother herself has a predominantly German-male set of values). A marriage in which the mother challenges the status of her husband is rarely a happy one in Germany. The accepted pattern is for the wife to identify herself with her husband’s point of view, remaining subordinate to him, and for the child to find his own “natural” place, subordinate to both. It becomes a major problem when the father and mother do not come to a large measure of agreement and unity. When they do not represent the same point of view, when they exemplify different standards or ideals, the unresolved marital conflict is passed on to the children, who are forced to make a choice between them. The choice they make will depend on the relative strengths of the personalities of the two parents as individuals, and the children’s identifications. However, German children particularly resent having to make such a choice; they prefer the simple, straightforward family pattern, without a marital conflict. Ideally, their parents should be in complete unity. The inability of the German child to tolerate differences of opinion is reflected in adult life in the endless splitting and fragmentation of political parties. Unaccustomed to accept sincere disagreements as inevitable in an honest relationship, and finding it difficult to adopt a working compromise openly arrived at for the sake of group unity, the German prefers to eject the disagreeing elements. These elements naturally remain as rivals and competitors at a later time, and therefore every disagreement as to principles is seen as an unpleasant and potentially threatening situation. [11] This situation provides fertile soil for the development of either latent or overt homosexuality in the male children. In German opinion, it is the wife who should give in to her husband. A wife should suppress her own beliefs, at least outwardly, to make for peace in the home. A German woman feels that it is her duty to do so. The more typically German she is, the more willingly and quickly she will do so. This is easily seen in reading the responses on the political attitudes test to the following incomplete sentence: When a man expresses his political opinion, his wife should. ... In this case, it is not necessary to divide the answers into predominant or minority responses, since all the answers reflect the subordination of the German woman to her husband in the home: 1. keep still. This was the most frequent answer, given in about one-third of all the cases. 2. hold her tongue; women should never have anything to do with politics, it is unwomanly. 3. should not try to influence him. 4. should keep her opinion to herself. 5. play the role of a clever simulator; keep quiet in order not to endanger the marriage, or run the risk of seeming superior. 6. should only speak her mind if she is a very bright woman. 7. should have the right to criticize. 8. not just say, “Yes, amen.” 9. speak up, providing she has an opinion. 10. allow herself to be taught to understand it. 11. in every way stand faithfully and actively behind him. 12. if she happens to be interested in politics, may speak up; but women are unpolitical and will remain so. 13. need not agree absolutely, though women usually are inferior to men in their grasp of things. 14. express her own opinion, not be persuaded differently just because they happen to be married. 15. should not hide hers from him. 16. should not feel it is her duty to share his point of view. 17. not just agree and say, “I don’t know a thing about politics”; politics is just household management on a larger scale. It is considered unbecoming for a woman to express herself too freely in the presence of men. Women who disagree with their husbands in front of others transgress an unwritten law; if a woman does so, her husband considers it only proper to rebuke her severely or to ask her to be silent. “What do you know about it?” he might ask; “you’re only a woman!”[12] To allow his wife to continue would be to lose face; he therefore reacts immediately and sternly if there is any real or imagined challenge to his male status. This may occur at home or abroad, in the presence of the children as well as in the presence of strangers. [12] An English psychiatrist and student of German interpersonal relations has expressed the opinion that German families try to avoid quarrels and suppress them immediately because they fear the intensity of the reaction that might ensue. He believes the hostility between two Germans, or between a German husband and wife, is so great that unless controlled, they might injure one another. Therefore, the injunction to silence represents a prevention of catastrophe. The intellectual mother, who scorns “Kinder, Kuche und Kirche” as the scope of her activities and who may wish to embrace a profession, is likely to win little praise or sympathy from her typical German husband or child, or even from other women. Her children may be ashamed of such a deviation from the accepted norm. A woman doctor runs the risk of disapproval, not because she may be a poor doctor, but “because she is not a woman.” According to German thinking along traditional lines, a woman cannot be happy in a leading or independent position; “according to the laws of nature,” she can find happiness only in serving and in dependence. Consequently, German parents give much less thought to, and place less value upon, the higher education of their daughters than of their sons. In comparison with American women, the usual German thinks German women are happier because their duties in life are simple and carefully delineated, and because they are serving rather than being served. He thinks American men place women on a pedestal, which is unmanly on their part and not really desired by the women, who would be happier in the German pattern. The German husband thinks of sex relations as a duty and service owed him by his wife, and child-bearing as the fulfillment of her marital obligations. That German women develop relative sexual freedom early in life is probably connected with their conception of their function in life as passive compilers to the wishes of men, as well as to their need for demonstration of affection, which is relatively lacking within the austere German home. The former is partly conformity, and the latter partly rebellion. In general, German culture successfully restricts the woman to her home and to the role of obedient servant to the man. On the reverse side of the picture, since women have been restricted to a special sphere, they tend to take great pride in that sphere. A German housewife prides herself on her “womanly” attainments, her cooking and her sewing, her thrift, her cleanliness and orderliness. She is proud of the number of children she has borne, and she generally raises large families. She also tries to keep her sphere “for women only.” She derides a man who may be interested in cooking or sewing, and bars him from the kitchen or the nursery. The cult of womanliness is the counterpart of the cult of manliness, and just as exclusive. The only difference is that manliness carries with it more prestige than womanliness, and therefore certain of the manly values have crept into the womanly ideal. German women pride themselves on their physical endurance, their ability to do heavy work without complaining, and their stoicism in the face of pain. Generally they tend to repress emotions of affection, fear, and pain, although they make no effort to suppress hatred for the deviant or the outsider. German women can be very aggressive; they are taught not to look to men for protection, but to protect themselves. In womanly physique, greater value is laid upon the robust, solid form than on passing styles or slimness. Their dress tends to be subdued in color, often drab, and the cut is somewhat mannish (the peasant costumes, which date back many centuries, are an exception to this). The German woman is not a pacifist, but believes that combat is glorious, and that without war a nation becomes decadent. This is to be expected from the fact that women derive their political views from men, and also from the fact that they are part of the German culture, in which the feminine ideal has been so strongly influenced by the greater social value of manliness. The women adopt a predominantly masculine set of values and reject many of the “feminine” traits striven for in other cultures. The Valkyrie woman-figure expresses for the most part the German feminine ideal. A corollary of the German woman’s position in her definite niche, with her responsibilities exactly prescribed and limited, is that she tends to be conservative. One might postulate (i) that she is well adjusted to the system, and (2) that she fears the loss of the dependent position. Even when she is dependent on her huband and inferior in status to him, she still has her superiority over servants and unmarried women. If she were less subservient, her status would be less secure. She dreads change which might force her to compete with men instead of serving them. In general, German women defend the existing system and do not want to exchange it for a society in which, they would have a freer but more responsible role. This is in accord with anthropological studies indicating that, in most cultures, women are more conservative than men, possibly because the maternal function requires more external stability than the male role in life. ** The Indoctrination of the German Child According to the data obtained in the psychiatric interviews, most Germans have a romantic nostalgia for their childhood, which they think of as a carefree, joyous period, possibly the best in their whole lives. They remember the protecting, generous father, the loving mother, and the close family life. But once the child has left the confines of the home and has begun to go to school, his world is no longer a happy playground in which he can enjoy the process of growing up. In a serious and uncertain environment, he becomes busy with earnest preparations for adult life, with constant fears of failure to meet the demands of exacting parents and equally exacting teachers. Germans are rarely very happy after their early childhood. Even during that childhood, they can be happy only under the conditions laid down by their parents. On this point, a candidate examined at the Screening Center expressed himself as follows:
Externally it appears to be a happy one, but internally there are many conflicts. Germans are never able to be happy; there is really no incentive to be young or gay or to enjoy life without restriction. It makes a young German always want to die. I noticed this especially during the war. It wasn’t just the ever-present danger in the battle, or a desire to evade it; it was just the wish to be dead, to sacrifice one’s self, no matter for what goal. All Germans are always under pressure. None of us can develop harmoniously.It is important to understand the atmosphere in which German children are raised, because the psychological trends induced in children become a permanent part of the adult personality and, through the whole generation of adults, a part of the German national character. *** Discipline and Work From infancy on, the child learns that he is a part of a system in which he is of inferior rank and that he must obey his superiors. This is known as Disziplin, a cardinal feature of German life. The sooner a child learns discipline, the sooner he becomes adjusted to that life. Following the rules is all that is asked of him. His daily life, the order in which things must be done, the rituals he must observe, are all prescribed and easy for him to determine. If he does all that is expected of him, on time, and up to the standard that is set, he can avoid punishment and win his parents’ favor. From infancy on, life is made up of efforts to meet exacting goals and assignments. Diligence and energy in carrying out these assignments will be rewarded. The parents desire their child be to constructively busy at all times, fleissig or industrious. Laziness and idleness are almost synonymous vices, not to be tolerated. Industry consists of the ability to work hard and for long periods of time, even when the work is very strenuous or repetitive. Parents teach their children that work will solve all problems and overcome all obstacles, and that it is the German’s ability to work which has distinguished himself, his family, his city and country from all others. Arbeit macht das Leben suss (Work makes life sweet) is a proverb very frequently quoted in the home. Children are taught that happiness consists primarily in the effort that one puts into one’s work, and that being without work is one of the worst misfortunes that can befall a man. Relaxation and idleness are not states to be enjoyed. Once the goals have been set by the parents, the child is expected to work hard at them until they are reached. If the assignment is too difficult, the parents are ready to help. They keep close watch over his progress, and in so far as he meets their standards, he remains secure within the family circle. In so far as he fails, he is punished, and parental approval and favor are withdrawn. The extreme penalty for failure may be banishment from the family group. The close supervision by the parents, their prompt reaction to success or failure, their power over the child’s happiness or unhappiness at home, make the child very dependent on the wishes of the parents. *** Fear of Authority, and Obsessive Traits Germans demonstrate an obsessive character trait in their involuntary tendency to repeat or to hold on to certain patterns, physical as well as emotional. They show this trait over and over in everyday life; they enjoy following established formulas. They relinquish with difficulty an idea they are committed to. Once they have decided on a plan of action, they feel they must follow it through to the bitter end, regardless of the consequences. It is difficult for them to modify activity during the act itself, because of their need to complete the act before beginning a different one, even when the two acts are closely related and might have been performed simultaneously. This makes adjustment difficult and slow. Where does this anxiety, this fear of digression or deviation come from? Why is the German so afraid to interrupt or to modify? Why does he enjoy repetitive activity so much more than patternless, unprescribed free scope? One might postulate its origin in the following train of events. Early in childhood the German child develops fear of failure and anxiety over the consequences of failure. He then puts forth relatively greater effort to succeed, becomes more thorough, more repetitive, in order to make sure that there has been no slipping up. With fear of not completing a job satisfactorily, he can at least show his good intentions by continuing to work without stopping, by demonstrating his industry and thoroughness. This may alleviate the punishment in case of partial failure. The primary motive is not the completion of an act to one’s own satisfaction, but fear of reprisal from authority for failing to reach the goal that was set. This mechanism was well illustrated in the case of R., a publisher well known for his flawless work. R.’s father, who founded the publishing house, was a strict father with extremely high standards in his work. Though he tried to temper his strictness in dealing with his only son, he was very forceful in his demands. R. was extremely conscious both of his obligation to meet his father’s high standards and of his own inferiority. The son stated that he always followed his father’s wishes, never protested or rebelled against them, even when nearing the age of forty. R. is now a meticulous, pedantic perfectionist, who works unswervingly toward the goal his father set for him. Industry, thoroughness, and attention to detail are used to allay anxiety and fear. The process is reinforced in school, where learning is acquired by endless memorizing, and memorizing through infinite repetition, as tables of multiplication are often taught in American schools. The ideal is to become letter-perfect; thus the child becomes a literal-minded, legalistic individual, who lays great stress on the perfection of minutiae, and may actually neglect over-all principles while he fusses over details. Both the home and the school tend to make the German child obsessive. He learns through reward and punishment that obsessive, industrious hard work is an accepted and satisfying way of life. Compulsive tendencies are probably best exemplified in the concept of duty or Pflicht. A German feels compelled to do anything which he has been told is his Pflicht. It justifies any amount of hardship and self-sacrifice, whether these are self-imposed or imposed by others. Fathers can assure obedience by reminding the child that “This is your Pflicht” Disobedience is not only a violation of one’s respect for one’s father, in such a case, but also a violation of the abstract concept of duty. The German is not only afraid to disobey, but can achieve a high order of satisfaction from fulfilling the demands of his Pflicht. A striking example of this well-developed sense of duty was V.M., a 51-year old lawyer of superior intellectual endowment, a serious, conscientious individual who had spent the greater part of his life carrying out obligations to his family and to the cultural standards. His father died when he was four years old; his mother subsequently impressed him with his responsibility for the care of the entire family. As a child, he became an extremely hard worker and zielbewusst (goal-conscious). He disliked athletics, but believing that all young men must participate in some form of exercise he forced himself to spend one or two hours every day in strenuous physical activity. Though he was passionately interested in philosophy and languages, he deliberately gave them up in order to study a profession, so that he could better support his family. He studied law, though he stated that he had always hated it, because it limited one’s thinking and deadened life. He fell in love at twenty-one, but did not marry until he was thirty-five, because he felt he could not do so until his brothers and sisters had all completed their educations and had married. He did not wish to have children until he had achieved a greater degree of financial security, but after his marriage “realized” that it was his duty to raise a family. He now has four children. His wife inherited a controlling interest in a famous old publishing house. Though he thought it would have been better for him to concentrate his energies on his law practice, sell her interest or take only a small share in the management of the publishing business, he felt obligated to safeguard her interests personally and to carry on her family tradition. Therefore he took on the entire responsibility for it in addition to his own practice. All his life he has felt his Pflicht as a German to become thoroughly familiar with the German classics, and systematically reads Goethe and Schiller instead of the contemporary writers. He became a tense, overburdened lawyer and publisher, satisfied with his life. In this connection, it is interesting to recall the classical psychoanalytic formulation of the character with obsessive-compulsive traits. Obsessive-compulsive personalities are described as being
concerned about conflicts between aggressiveness and submissiveness, cruelty and gentleness, dirtiness and cleanliness, disorder and order.... They tend to display frugality and obstinacy, to strive for a feeling of moral superiority which is needed to increase their self-esteem as a counter-balance against the pressure of paternal authority.[13]There is a close similarity between the theoretical description of the obsessive-compulsive character and the outstanding characteristics found in the Germans we studied. It is tempting to postulate that the early habit-training, and the inculcation of strict obedience and sense of duty in infancy and childhood are the significant factors in the development of the obsessive character which so many Germans show as adults. [13] Otto Fenichel, Psychoanalytic Theory of the Neuroses (New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1945), pp. 273–279. *** Restriction and Obedience At few points, if any, does the typical German child come to know the meaning of freedom. His own free fantasy is discouraged by the system of training and education. He is not taught to express himself as an individual but to make himself like the German ideal. He becomes purpose-minded and goal-minded. He learns to concentrate all his energies on the task at hand, disregarding related problems which might interest him but for which no solution is demanded by his parents. The child is thereby deprived of much of his own initiative. He is told when to return from school, how long he can spend playing on the street with other children, what child he may or may not associate with, and he is kept closely under his parents’ eyes in the evening. His play and his studies at school are closely supervised. He finds his teachers, who are usually men, as strict as his father at home. He is taught that it is unwise for children to be granted much freedom, because they lack the judgment to use it. Freedom is identified with disobedience and lawlessness, which are repugnant to the German system. Thus, children are not only denied freedom but induced not to want it. Obedience to authority, not independence, is held up as the ideal. The child is made to feel comfortable in bowing to authority, by assurances that the best possible way of life has been selected for him, and that to wander from the indicated path is to court trouble. He finds emotional satisfaction in conforming, and in demonstrating his conformance. Later, deep anxiety is aroused by any attempts to swerve him from the established groove. The child learns, usually by the time he is five, that obedience is the key to a happy relationship with his elders. He no longer questions the right of his father or his teachers to command him and punish him. He has learned to obey as a matter of course, and he does everything possible to avoid incurring anger or corporal punishment. Corporal punishment for disobedience was abolished in the German schools by the Weimar Republic, but was quickly reinstated by Hitler. Its continuation in the schools is possible because of its prior sanction within the home, and it therefore creates no special conflict in the German child as it would in his American counterpart. *** Passivity and Aggression As one would expect from a study of the German father’s attitude toward his children, the young child’s attitude toward his father must be essentially passive. As long as no other person or factor interferes, the child can be expected to be compliant and to assimilate en masse his father’s behavior, his father’s attitude toward other individuals, toward women, family, marriage, politics and any other issues important to him. The passive child accepts these standards, and incorporates them into his own Weltanschauung. When he reaches maturity, he treats his children in the same fashion. Thus, the passive child becomes in turn the master, the authoritative father of the next generation. Kept subordinate through coercion and harshness, he adopts the identical methods when he graduates into his own paternal status, and as if in revenge, becomes an aggressive, arrogant adult. He may even have a chance to practice the father’s methods with younger brothers and sisters or with servants, who are on an inferior social level. A striking example of this was seen in O., a movie director examined at the Screening Center. He was the son of an autocratic father who insisted on strictest obedience. O. stated that he had been a model child, always submitting to discipline and obeying his father to the letter. In early adolescence he developed marked feelings of inferiority, and he did not do well in school. He did not get along with his teachers, and felt that he was not liked by the other pupils. He tried to excel in his schoolwork and in sports, and attempted, unsuccessfully at first, to outwit and out-maneuver his fellow students. Failing to achieve recognition in the Gymnasium and the universities that he attended, he later founded his own Geistige Akademie, but had only two followers. He is now an overbearing, boastful, ambitious individual, who has had to be removed from positions he held under Military Government, because of his domineering and dictatorial conduct toward people working around him. The enforced passivity in German childhood is in this way a factor in producing the aggressiveness, hardness, and even cruelty of the German adult. There are of course varying degrees of hardness. The German father believes in being strict with his child but not in being deliberately brutal. He exercises his authority in a benevolent frame of mind, “just” punishment for the sake of the child’s future welfare. The brutality exhibited by the Germans toward outsiders, nonconformists and “racially inferior groups” during the Nazi period was not the regular behavior of a German father, using his paternal authority to punish disobedient children. It was rather like the revenge of Germans against representatives of groups which had unjustly usurped or exceeded authority (for example, the authority granted through the un-German Treaty of Versailles). We might think of it as a retaliatory mechanism releasing suppressed aggression. German children grow accustomed to firmness and hardness in their childhood, and they learn to accept its use when they become adults. Brutality, on the other hand, appears to be their angry response to an exaggeration of that hardness in the treatment they receive from others. Germans seem to employ brutality to punish one who misuses authority and to retaliate against those who cause them frustrations. In this manner, the authoritative system which exacts passivity and subservience from those on lower levels provides an outlet for aggression against extreme or misused authority. The aggression is not to be directed against accepted authority which always remains untouchable, but against unacceptable authorities who have exceeded their rights or have attempted to displace a recognized father-figure. This throws additional light on the reasons for the German disinclination to revolt against authority except in very special cases. There are factors which modify the passivity-aggression pattern within the German child. The relative symbolic weight of the paternal or maternal influences within the home, the degree of identification with or rebellion against paternal standards, can profoundly affect the child’s passivity-aggression ratio. One does not find the traditionally passive child, conscious of his inferiority, restrained by rigid regulations, completely dependent on the dicta of his superiors, in homes in which the father is not a typical disciplinary figure or from which he is absent by reason of death or other causes, or in which the maternal, feminine influences have succeeded in permeating family attitudes. In such homes one finds a child with a greater sense of individual worth and of his rights as an individual, and with a less restricted personality. One finds that the mother has been warm and demonstrative, and not so authoritative and disciplinary as the father would have been. If the mother has simply replaced the typical German father, or if she actually overshadows him (that is, has incorporated authority in herself), the child may develop according to the typical pattern. But when the father is atypical or nonauthoritarian, or when a dead father is replaced by an indulgent father-substitute such as an uncle or a grandfather, the child’s chances of developing more freely, more independently—and even his chance of becoming critical of authority—are increased. In such a case he may not become passive and unquestioningly obedient but may develop his own self-esteem and play a more active role in the family life. In the cases studied it appears that the greater the degree of maternal affection and kindliness experienced by the child in his formative years, the more expansive and unrestricted will be his growth; concomitantly, the less harshness, intolerance, and passivity will be displayed by him as an adult. When the German marriage relationship is a unified one, with the wife cooperating wholeheartedly with her husband in the training of the children, no dilemma arises: sons and daughters, alike, develop along the lines laid down by the father. However, in a family in which the father and mother are not in harmony, or have failed to agree on the goals of child-training, it becomes highly significant whether the child identifies himself with his mother or with his father. The child who rejects the father’s influence and is supported in this by his mother emerges as a rebel against the traditional authoritative pattern. He does not accept the code of blind obedience and subservience, but develops in the opposite direction. If the father happens to be the usual German father, the life of such a child is stormy and unhappy, and the pattern of revolt against the father is increased by the father’s efforts to keep the son in line. As stated in the Round Table Conference on “Germany after the War,”[14]
Developmentally, the child vis-a-vis the parents is expected to be dependent, submissive and exhibitionistic, to exhibit his submissiveness in hand-shaking, heel-clicking, “correct” behavior. Two simultaneous solutions of his role are always present, and his emotional development reflects the varying degrees of importance of the two —on the one hand the complete emotional commitment to an ideal, which culminates in the sturm and drang of adolescence, and contains the romanticism of dying for an ideal, etc.; on the other hand, submission to discipline, security and a practical civilian domestic status in which he is identified with the conforming aspects of his father’s behavior. Both solutions contain elements of acceptance and elements of rejection of both parents, thus providing a major factor in the extremely disturbed character of German adolescence.The rebellious child generally does not become passive, but develops into an active, aggressive opponent of the entire authoritative system, especially when he is supported by his mother. In fact, the mother, herself unable to break out of her own predestined role, may vent her aggression against her husband by encouraging her son’s efforts to free himself from the father’s domination. There are also cases in which a child succeeds in freeing himself from the authority of a united mother and father, because of influences outside the family, from school comrades, religious teachers, reading, or foreign travel. But the extent of receptivity depends to a large degree on the success or failure of the indoctrination before the child is exposed to these outside influences. This is well illustrated in the case of H., a liberal newspaper editor who consistently fought the Nazis. H. grew up in an average German home which followed the traditional cultural patterns. His father was an upright, serious-minded man of strict principles, who exercised a moderate degree of authority over the children. He was seclusive in habits and did not intrude into every phase of their daily lives. He paid little attention to politics, but voted along conservative lines. The mother was an industrious housewife, self-sacrificing, quite religious; she tried to direct her son toward the policies of the Catholic political parties. H. was happy at home, and in general followed his parents’ teachings until he went to the university. There he became acquainted with the sons of Baron von Hohenlohe, who had fought in the Civil War in the United States on the side of the North. These young men had been educated to believe in liberal, democratic government. Under their influence H. began to read the Schwarzwalder Boten, an antimilitarist and antiPrussian newspaper, and began to question the interference of the Church in political matters. In 1906, he refused to contribute toward the purchase of a torpedo boat for presentation to the Kaiser on his twenty-fifth wedding anniversary, and was denounced by other students as a radical Social Democrat. Subsequently he did join the Social Democratic party and became a staunch fighter for progressive principles. [14] American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, XV, No. 3 (July, 1945), 391, The child who identifies himself wholly with his father must of necessity internally suppress the mother’s point of view. If he identifies with his mother completely, he will probably adopt her pattern of alternating insecurity and passivity and live under the same subjective tensions that she does. If he attempts equal identification with both parents, the social and intellectual friction within the marriage is transferred to him, with a residue of a never-ending conflict. The divergent traits of both parents then rest side by side in an unresolved dualism, and integration of the child’s personality may fail altogether. The child may alternate between two extremes: at one time he will behave like his aggressive, dominating father, at others like his submissive, loving, insecure mother. The better the parents adjust themselves to the traditional German marriage relationship, the less conflict the child has to resolve, and the more likely he is to assimilate the authoritarian pattern in himself. In summing up, the authoritarian pattern demands passivity in the child. In so far as a child fails to learn this fundamental quality, he is unprepared for the society in which he is going to live. He may then become either an active rebel against authority, or merely a passive opponent. In either case, this deviant is unhappy in the usual German home, even when he is supported by one of the parents; he is also maladjusted outside the home, until he finds a group of other deviants. The pattern of passivity or aggression toward the system, which determines his behavior as an adult in German society, is formed during his childhood by his reaction to parental authority at home. *** Orderliness and Rigidity Ordnung (orderliness), another cardinal German virtue, appears to be an elaboration on the principle of obedience. It includes punctuality, meticulosity, propriety, and it is epitomized in tidiness. It is essentially respect for the arrangement of things as opposed to people. It is instilled into the German child from infancy on. He is taught to arrange his clothing in his room, to assign each article to a definite spot, and to keep or return it there. He must carefully replace each tool that he has used; his parents are deeply disturbed if he fails to do so. All objects must be classified, labeled, arranged in their proper order, and kept that way as far as possible. Disarrangement calls for restoration without delay. The orderly system must be logically planned, and it must be maintained. It is a carry-over to the realm of objects from the fixed and static relationships in human society. It is visible in every German home and garden, in every scheme devised by Germans. It is a step-by-step, detailed arrangement of affairs, designed for efficiency and permanency. It is not meant to be changed; any change in an established orderly arrangement is upsetting to the German mind. There can be only one correct, that is, orderly, way of doing a thing; this must always be followed. There are rules for the most minute situations and occasions. Children learn how important it is to keep one’s hands on the table during meals (below the table is indecent!), not to talk at table in the presence of adults, to go to sleep lying on one’s back, with the hands outside the covers (Germans joke about the bearded professor who always made sure his beard was not underneath the covers before he fell asleep). The German handshake is a ritual. It consists of (i) a firm quick grasp of the hands; (2) a brief easy raising of the clasped hands; (3) an energetic downward movement; (4) a quick release. If the hands are not unclasped immediately, flirtation is considered to be implied. Ordnung muss sein (There must be order) is heard over and over in German conversation. The child becomes conscious of it at a very early age. He is taught to see order and to maintain it. He becomes uneasy and fears punishment if he disturbs the natural or accustomed routine, and he tries to restore it to its previous state. He becomes a subscriber to the system, pledged to its preservation. Ordnung becomes an end in itself. This dislike of disorder remains with most Germans throughout life, and helps to explain the adult’s rigidity and his fear of change. The love of things in their accustomed state is also expressed in conservatism; Germans are loath to upset tradition. Orderliness helps to explain both German stubbornness and German resistance to reform or revolution, which would involve attacking the order of things which they have been taught to respect. The degree of feeling for orderliness gives us a clue to the profound emotional disturbance the German people are undergoing at present, forced to spend their days and nights amid the disorderly ruins of their former world; it is also one of the clues to their energy in rebuilding. *** Cleanliness and Fear of Contamination Closely allied to orderliness is another prime virtue, cleanliness, which is inculcated into each child as early as possible. A German child soon learns how much importance his parents place on his keeping clean and avoiding getting dirty. He knows he will be judged harshly if his shoes are not brushed and shined each day. So much significance is given well-polished shoes that he feels ill at ease unless they are gleaming, and in adult life he still feels the need to apologize if they are not. He watches his mother scrub her tile floors each day, and he knows what his punishment will be if he muddies the glistening surface. The family takes pride in keeping the house dustless, the linen snow white. It is soon apparent to the child that keeping clean and eliminating dirt are two of the most highly prized virtues one can acquire.[15] He begins to be ashamed of any spot or imperfection. He likes smooth, unblemished surfaces, and he feels uncomfortable in the presence of real or imagined contamination. He identifies cleanliness with purity (the German word rein is applied to both). He begins to judge people and things in these terms. He hears his father dismiss individuals as schmutzig (dirty). He hears that other children, other families, other nations are inferior, because they are not clean. He comes to learn that cleanliness is a standard of measurement to be applied to cultures and nations. He likes the idea that the Germans are a clean people; blond hair symbolizes “cleanness.” He believes that his is a relatively “pure” race, and should remain so. On principle, mixtures and alloys cannot be as desirable as pure strains. His response to the idea of keeping the German nation uncontaminated parallels his need to keep dirt off his hands and off his shoes. He firmly believes that Germans are cleaner than other people, the cleanest of all people in fact, and for that reason, among others, better than any other people in the world. [15] Curiously enough, Germans tend to be more concerned with the cleanliness of externals, which show, than with personal cleanliness. Streets, houses, and furniture are kept immaculate, with less emphasis on personal hygiene, in contrast to the French. *** Manliness and Militarism Above all, the German boy must learn manliness. He must acquire the behavior appropriate to his superior status as a man. He must cultivate a strong, massive body, powerful muscles, and athletic prowess. He must build up his endurance and his resistance to illness, fatigue, or privation. More important, he must develop a bearing which implies authority, a manner to inspire fear and compel obedience. This includes threatening gestures, which are permissible in dealings with inferiors (though they are considered reprehensible or insulting in behavior toward superiors). Manliness naturally requires the suppression of tenderness, pity, fear, and regret, but encourages the forceful expression of anger and temper. Any threat arouses an aggressive, instant, fierce response. Germans believe in training their young men in manliness until it becomes almost “instinctive.” So deeply ingrained is this attitude that a German reporter present at the execution of the war criminals in Nurnberg opened his account of the scene with the following sentence: “The deepest impression was the fact that all the defendants met their deaths bravely in a dignified and collected manner. Their behavior was above reproach with but one exception.”[16] [16] Dr. Jacob F. Leistner, Associated Press, Oct. 17, 1946. The line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior for men is carefully observed. A boy or a man cannot help women in the kitchen; he will not push his wife’s baby carriage. Important as it is to have his shoes polished, he does not shine them himself; that is a woman’s task. When a man and a woman are walking together, the woman must carry the packages. Moreover, it is unmanly to enjoy fiction; men’read history and biographies. It is not unmanly to be interested in the arts or to play a musical instrument; German tradition has given its sanctions to these. The story of one candidate illustrates the prevailing attitude.
My father was a Regular Army officer until 1918. He never drank or smoked, was very strict with me, military in his bearing, and conscious of tradition. I had only Ehrfurcht for him. I never felt close to him, only polite and formal. I always wanted to say Sie to him. My father never played with me, and didn’t allow me any friends outside the family. He made me an Einzelg’dnger (solitary person). I lived under pressure and the fear of his strictness. He was the personification of manliness. My mother represented a little more freedom to me; she was afraid of him too, and could never be as free as she wanted to be. Mother enjoyed music, but did not understand it; father really liked music, even though he wasn’t trained in it. He used to make me feel his rifles, trying to make me love them the way he did. I always wanted to run away from home. I finally decided to go to work in the films. My father was shocked because it didn’t seem manly to him.... I have a recurrent dream, about running away to a warm, soft, tropical climate.When he was a prisoner of war in England in 1944, he stripped the insignia of rank from his uniform, and was thereupon snubbed by the other German prisoners. He was an anti-Nazi. It is considered unmanly for a husband to ask his wife’s advice in business matters, or to be swayed by her in domestic matters. It is an insult to a man’s dignity to take an order from a woman; Germans resent women in positions of authority. Demonstrating affection, especially in public, is considered weibisch (womanish). It is not becoming for a man to waver in a decision, to change his mind, or to yield in a discussion. According to Brickner, German prisoners of war who participated in the reeducation program at Fort Getty in the United States remarked that they had never previously understood that there was a difference between a debate and a discussion. They were amazed to learn that intelligent compromise need not involve a loss of prestige or give rise to personal animosities. It is thought unmanly to shy away from administering or receiving corporal punishment. Instances have been reported in which parents visited the schools their children attended, and requested the teachers to be sure to punish the children frequently in order to develop Hartschlagigkeit (the ability to take corporal punishment without wincing or resentment).[17] Manliness finds its highest expression in fighting. Hence the university student’s pride in duelling, a ritual which was not properly completed until the contestants’ faces had been scarred, and hence the pride with which the students bore these scars for the rest of their lives.[18] It is no doubt psychologically significant that the Weimar Republic forbade duelling in 1920. The cult of manliness underlies the German belief in the nobility of a soldier’s life and death. It makes the German approve of war as a solution of international problems, and scorn pacifism as soft. The child is taught in his earliest schooling that it is glorious to die for one’s country and that living without risking death is unmanly. Therefore it is only natural to admire the military forms early in life. The small boy enjoys imitating the marching and drilling, likes the prospect of donning the uniform one day himself, and attempts to acquire a military ring in his voice. He looks forward to a continuation of the Disziplin he learned at home and in school, to the security that comes from knowing the limitations of freedom, and the orderly, ritualistic, repetitive activities of the soldier’s life. He derives satisfaction from performing his Pflicht to his country, and has a permitted outlet for his aggressive tendencies; in soldiering he finds the embodiment of the manly ideal. [17] Hartschlagigkeit is not the only word used in Germany to express this idea. The same concept is described in different words in various localities. [18] After the face was cut, university students did not report for medical care, but went to barber-shops to have their wounds packed with cotton. In this way they could prevent the healing of the cut without a scar, and insured the formation of a thick, prominent, welt-like line across the cheek. *** Family Pride and Nationalism Another characteristic drilled into all German children is a strong consciousness of the family. Family solidarity, the sense of belonging to one’s group, is emphasized throughout child training. The parents try to keep their children within the home as much as possible, within the family circle, and dependent on it. Of course parents in all cultures try to maintain control over their children, but in Germany the emphasis is not so much on affectionate protection as control and direct supervision. Each child is taught to be intensely proud of his father, proud of his whole family, and of his family religion. Family life is considered sacrosanct. The German father likes to keep his family closely knit, all the members under his thumb. He fosters the idea that the children belong to a special group, and discourages intimacy with other groups, except those of which he may approve. Family relationships acquire a special significance, and family occasions are celebrated with great festivities. It is important for children to remember each relative’s birthday, and to write or visit each relative regularly. The children soon acquire a special feeling for members of their own family in contrast to outsiders. The exaggerated consciousness of belonging to a specific group, and of reacting against those who are outside it, extends far beyond simple family life, but retains the same basic feeling. There are special loyalties for members of the same school, the same sports club, the same church, the same political organization, and a special pride in regional differences. It becomes highly important to belong officially to these organizations, to formalize one’s sharing of the common point of view. It is not enough merely to be in sympathy with it, or to associate informally with the members. One must register and belong; otherwise one is on the outside. As a result, Germans join an amazingly large number of organizations, each with its distinctive principles. Organizations tend to be exclusive rather than inclusive, with names which clearly state their aims. Whereas our clubs and organizations tend to be multi-purpose, each German society has ordinarily a single clearly defined function. There are not simply youth groups including all young people, but groups for each denomination and each political tendency: Catholic Youth, Lutheran Youth, Socialist Youth, Communist Youth, each proudly separate from the others. There are similar subdivisions for hobbies—singing, gymnastics, hiking, mountain-climbing, stamp-collecting—each sharply delineated from the rest. If one’s interests change, or if one is no longer in agreement with the line a group is following, one must resign or be expelled. One is either wholly in or wholly out. Pride in being German is paramount, the quintessence of the group loyalties, a special all-embracing pride planted carefully in every German child. In Germany this nationalism, the exaggerated consciousness of and emphasis upon one’s nation, is probably as great as, if not greater than, in any other modern state. What is striking to the American observer is the degree to which it enters into the daily lives and conversation of Germans. It has a deeply personal quality; touching upon it releases unexpectedly large amounts of intense emotion. It is the national parallel to the intense group pride of the individual German family. Nationalism is usually intensified in any country which participates in a war, as for example in the United States after 1940, where a high degree of national pride replaced the somewhat scornful attitude toward patriotism which existed between World Wars I and II. In Germany, where wars have been waged so frequently in the last four centuries, nationalism is an automatic part of a child’s equipment for life. The word “National” itself appears frequently in the vocabulary, as in Nationalgefuhl, nationale Erziehung, Nationalstolz (feeling for one’s country, training for one’s country, national pride). The German is taught not only that his loyalty belongs to the German state, but that the German way of life is superior to all others, that he must always think with pride of German achievements. He is taught to believe that German composers, philosophers, authors, painters and scientists are the finest found in any culture. He is taught and he believes that the German soldier has the greatest stamina and capacity for self-sacrifice, of any soldier in the world. He is easily led to believe that German “blood” is not just a symbolic way of expressing a national inheritance, but that it is an actuality, different from and superior to the blood of any other people. He believes that German ability to organize and to govern is the best in the world, and that all the Germans need is the opportunity to demonstrate their superiority and perfection; he swells his individual ego in identifying himself with the German group. According to the recent studies of McGranahan, “feelings of German superiority linger on, apparently confined now to moral and cultural pre-eminence. From the time the tide of battle changed, Germans have clung to the supposition that their spiritual superiority was overcome only by the brute force of materiel.”[19] [19] Donald V. McGranahan of Harvard University, “A Comparison of Social Attitudes among American and German Youth,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. LXI, No. 3, July, 1946. In the survey of the rank and file of the population, Germans were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, In general, Germans are acknowledged to be the cleverest workers in the world. Fifty-four percent of all the men, women, and youths questioned agreed, 39 percent disagreed, and 7 percent did not express themselves or had no opinion. The population in Berlin approved the statement in 63 percent of the cases, and 34 percent disagreed. This was in spite of the showing made by nonGerman workers who produced the quantity of weapons that had defeated the German nation only a year earlier! Germans do not like to think even of the atomic bomb as anything but their own. In the first issue of the first newspaper to be published in Nuremberg after the war, an editorial was entitled, “The Atom Bomb, a German Invention.” Germans are scornful and suspicious of foreign ideas, and without examining them very deeply, know that Germany has far better ones to offer. When a German is outside Germany, or in contact with non-Germans, he is deeply conscious of the necessity for keeping his national identity intact. German colonists have lived outside Germany, in Yugoslavia, Rumania, and the Ukraine for nearly two hundred years without learning the native language, maintaining both their German ways and their German citizenship. However, single individuals out of touch with any of their fellow countrymen are assimilated into other cultures quite rapidly. This may be due to the universal human need to be identified with the security and power of some group. Membership in a group does not always or necessarily produce feelings of security or mutual trust among its members. As in the German family, where the child’s primary allegiance is to the father rather than to his brothers and sisters, there may be keen rivalry for a favored position with the leader or fathersubstitute. This competition can give rise to jealousy and dislike, and may create anxiety about one’s status within the group. There is fear of falling out of favor with other members, and guilt-feeling over the wish to raise one’s own status above that of the others. This is well illustrated in the case of K., a publisher. He was the youngest of seven children. Because the father was already advanced in years when the boy was born, and paid little attention to him except by way of reprimand or discipline, K.’s eldest brother became his model, but was always so far ahead in studies, sports, and professional accomplishments that K. felt vastly inferior. He felt keenly that the sister nearest him in age was his parents’ favorite. He was a very unhappy child. As the youngest in the family, he came under the jurisdiction of each of his siblings at one time or another, and was oversensitive to his position as the lowest in the family hierarchy. He believed that he had no chance to achieve any position or authority either in the home or in the family business, and was extremely jealous of his older brothers who were ahead of him. At the same time he thought these feelings of jealousy and resentment were wrong, and tried to overcome them by developing an attitude of protectiveness toward his brothers and sisters. His oldest brother had become a member of the Nazi party, and was therefore ineligible to continue as head of the publishing house; for this reason, K. was sent to the Screening Center to determine his fitness to take over the business. However, he was uncomfortable at the thought of assuming the position of authority while his brother was still alive, and instead of convincing us that he was capable of heading the firm, he persistently tried to persuade us that his brother had meant no harm in joining the Nazis and should be allowed to continue in his old position. All his life he had been waiting for the opportunity to raise his status within the family but, when he finally had a chance to do so, he became anxious and afraid. An individual German can derive greater satisfaction out of belonging to a group when all its members are fighting a common enemy than when he is functioning alone within his group, exposed to competition from his fellows. Internal pressures normally produce insecurity, whereas external pressures increase feelings of security; these mechanisms are particularly clear and more obvious among Germans than in other cultures. It is interesting to see this group consciousness growing out of the basic authoritarian system in the family, with its hierarchy. The father uses the family group relationships as a means of keeping his authority. The group-awareness and group-loyalty instilled by him culminate in group-admiration for and dependence upon him. He builds up exaggerated pride in the principles on which the family system is based. In this way, he lays the emotional foundation for the intense German-group consciousness, or nationalism, of the German adult. *** Personal Status and Army Rank Consciousness of membership in a family and of having a well-defined status within it is likewise the basis for the child’s adaptation to the German social caste system. Each child learns his relative position among the various levels on which Germans are arranged, and must adjust his behavior to that which is appropriate to the level. Unfortunately (from our point of view), Germans are not given to thinking in terms of “equals” who happen to be on the same hierarchical level as themselves, but in terms of superiors and inferiors. In relation to other people, they are therefore either masters or servants in their own minds. This easily leads to inner conflicts and problems of external behavior, since circumstances may force acceptance of both roles simultaneously. Whatever the problems in relation to those above and below, the factors determining a man’s actual level are fairly clear and easy to determine. In childhood, age and physical size are paramount. In school, scholastic attainments determine the seating in the classroom; the student with the highest grades sits farthest from the teacher, the one with the lowest grades nearest. Economic distinctions begin to be important during adolescence and have definite consequences at school age. By the time he is ten, a child knows whether he is one of the favored group who will go on to secondary school, university, and a profession, or whether he will be separated from them, to receive only Volks-schule (elementary school) education and vocational training. The former group acquires a feeling of superiority, the latter a feeling of inferiority so widespread in the population as to increase the submissiveness on which the authoritarian rule of the “better educated” is based. Social distinctions take place within each vocational group: farmers are ranked by the size of their farms, the number of cattle they own, the number and strength of their sons. Storekeepers are a step above manual laborers who are employed by others, but the skilled artisan has a somewhat higher standing than the small shopkeeper and clerical worker. The German policeman, clothed with the authority of the local government, is a man of even higher rank, calling for fear and respect. Next comes the public official, the Beamte, the representative of still higher authority. His name is unimportant but his official position is all-important. He possesses the same relative position of authority toward the public as the German father toward his children: he usually feels entitled to deal with the public in a distant manner and does so in a superior and often irritating tone of voice. Germans differentiate between the lesser and the greater officials, and treat the latter, of course, far more deferentially. Teachers, lawyers, doctors, and dentists have specific rank within the occupational community; this is acknowledged by including the profession in the terms of address as Herr Rechtsawwalt Schmitt, Herr Professor Stein. In the same way, professional distinctions are carefully observed, as Herr Doktor Becker or Herr Oberstabsarzt Becker. The wife of the teacher, doctor, or lawyer automatically acquires the recognition due to her husband’s status, and is addressed as Frau Rechtsawwalt Schmitt or Frau Oberstabsarzt Becker. Titles are given not only to identify, but also to establish, social prestige. Since they may be acquired through university study, getting a university degree is a widespread, serious ambition. Titles of nobility, inherited or bestowed during the Imperial reigns, did not even disappear during either the Republic or the Nazi period. They were too much a part of German thinking to be discarded lightly, too fundamental to the German need to know exactly where one stands in the social hierarchy. Awareness of one’s own status, after all, is comforting and anxiety-allaying. A father knows what he may expect and demand from his family merely because he is the father. A wife and son and daughter know what their duties are, simply because they are the wife and son and daughter. A doctor knows that he will be treated respectfully by the butcher and that he will not be censured if he speaks rudely or with condescension to the carpenter’s wife; he is correspondingly secure in being humble before his own superiors. Titles of all kinds make status awareness simpler and have therefore remained in general usage. Within each profession there are numerous gradations of rank. German apprentices know that they are at the lowest rung of their vocational ladder, and live a most menial, degraded existence. This apprenticeship applies not only to skilled trades but to most forms of business. The apprentice usually goes to live in the home of his apprentice-master, where he occupies the lowliest position in the household. He is expected to work incredibly long hours over a two-year period, receives his board and keep and very little pay. He tolerates the roughest treatment in order to get the coveted title of Meister in his trade; for without it, no matter how long his training or how great his skill, he will not be paid more than an untrained laborer. The German has to learn these rigid social regulations and distinctions and has to accept them as part of normal life. Some degree of security as to status may result from the system, but it also imposes severe limitations in dealing with others (a man has no alternative; he must work and learn under these conditions) ; moreover, there is constant danger of some loss of rank, of “becoming less.” Nevertheless, the stratification of human beings is an integral part of German life against which few Germans rebel. Having adjusted to the caste system early in life, the German child is emotionally prepared for the military life by the time he reached manhood. The military organization and system are not unfamiliar to him; he does not need to make a major adjustment as do drafted American youth. The army is merely another branch of the family and social pattern to which he has already become adjusted. He is assigned a definite rank, with a title, and enters a life of discipline, orderliness, cleanliness, and manliness, a life in which his nationalistic feelings are given concrete expression. The uniform becomes the proud symbol of all the concepts which he had been taught to honor and serve since childhood. It brings him admiration and raises his social status. The German feels at home in his uniform. The world he has always lived in and the army have the same basis: the military is no different from his home, his school or his professional life. He is emotionally and intellectually conditioned to fit into it. He is, conversely, unprepared for freedom or for the appreciation of independence. It would not normally occur to him to think of rebelling against the army in the German social system. At the time of this study, nearly all Germans expressed themselves as being against war and gave lip-service to the idea that Germany should not rebuild her army. At the Screening Center 80 percent completed the sentence, The reconstruction of the German Army should ... as follows, with strong and definite stands against a new army: 1. not take place under any circumstances. 2. never again happen. 3. Germany should be demilitarized for all time. 4. we don’t need an army. I wouldn’t know what for. 5. never occur. The Army always brings catastrophe to Germany. 6. be positively and actively prevented. 7. disappear from the wish-fulfillment dreams of Germans. 8. never happen again, in order to extinguish militarism from the German people. However, when the same Germans were asked to express approval or disapproval of military training, only 40 percent of the group offered any criticism of it while the rest either apologized for or defended it. They completed the sentence, For young men, military service is ... as follows: 1. a good schooling in self-discipline and comradeship. 2. physically beneficial. 3. part good, part bad. 4. useful when one lacks other training institutions. 5. good, even though the Prussian variety is torture. 6. the best way to train real obedience. 7. good for training discipline and maintaining tradition. 8. often rough on young people; it requires the highest type teachers. 9. a necessary evil. 10. a serious duty and responsibility. 11. required in the interests of the State, and may have some good in it. 12. useful to train cleanliness, comradeship, and discipline. 13. not enjoyable, but good. 14. a good thing, except for its chauvinism. 15. definitely good, but discipline could be made more voluntary. 16. not necessary if the parents have done a good job in training. Only 3 percent mentioned any connection between military training and ‘war! It is significant that so many of the responses indicated a masochistic attitude toward the discomfort or “torture” of military training. Instead of rebelling against it, they tried to justify it. It is apparent that in the German mind, military training is only a part of the indoctrination of certain codes of social behavior, a kind of post-graduate training after the parents have carried their own type of education as far as possible. Military training is not thought of as merely preparation for war but as a prelude to and exercise in normal adult life. Some of the Germans who were questioned further about this aspect of the subject thought that important character traits, such as manliness, group life with other men and self-discipline could not be properly taught within the home because of the presence and influence of the mother. When asked if they thought it possible to continue military training without automatically rebuilding an army, many seemed perplexed, as if there were no connection between the two. Therefore the expression of opinion against rebuilding a German army seems very superficial and is probably only a temporary reaction to the recent military defeat, not a basic change of attitude. The belief in the necessity and wholesomeness of military life is still too deeply rooted in the German mind and in German mores to have been seriously affected. *** Choice of Political Affiliation In commenting on political events inside Germany over the last thirty years, the majority of Germans sum up the record by saying, “We are politically immature (politisch unretf).” In this way they absolve themselves of any mistakes they have made by underlining the fact that they have not reached an adult level in political thinking. They apparently recognize that they have not been trained to approach political problems as independent, responsible, and critical citizens. They do not think of government as a matter in which they are capable of taking an active part as individuals, and are therefore generally unable to feel guilt for what the government has done, even when, as in the case of Hitler, it was done in their name. At present Germans feel especially inadequate to handle their own governmental problems. This is strikingly shown by their reactions to the statement, Germany should be occupied for many years, until the German people are able to form a democratic government. Sixty-nine percent of the 2,000 men and women questioned in the American zone endorsed the idea; 23 percent disagreed while 8 percent gave no reply. In Berlin alone, 79 percent of the group questioned approved the idea. One is tempted to ask whether these replies can be considered sincere or whether they were not calculated merely to flatter the occupation government. This may be true in certain cases. However, pro-Nazi elements generally desire to have the British and American armies remain in Germany as long as Russian troops are still there. Anti-Nazis, who feel outnumbered by traditional and reactionary Germans, usually desire the presence of foreign troops in order to suppress the pro-Nazi elements whom they still fear. The replies probably indicate a desire to postpone taking over governmental responsibility for a variety of reasons. The same group was also asked to comment on this sentence, As long as the government takes care of all our essential needs, we should not interest ourselves in politics. This time, nearly half the group (44) percent agreed; and, in cosmopolitan Berlin alone, over half agreed (52 percent). There was similar approval in the southern areas, but 82 percent of the Marburg University students disagreed, indicating a hopefully different point of view in the younger and more intellectual Germans; unfortunately the students are not a representative group. These replies demonstrate a widespread disinclination to take an active, responsible role in politics. Many Germans feel that they lack the capacity to handle their own political problems or to reach solutions without guidance. These sentiments were intensified by the recent defeat, so that a majority actually prefer life under an Army of Occupation to the opportunity to find a solution unaided. According to McGranahan, “average German young people appear to have a remarkably uniform contempt for the mental capacity of the average person. Such lack of faith in their fellow countrymen is doubtless one of the reasons why many Germans have misgivings about the possibilities of democracy in their country.” This sense of political inferiority was similarly brought out by the replies to the statement, The mass of the people are stupid and are not able to have their oven opinion. Again nearly half (42 percent) of the entire group agreed. In Berlin 49 percent approved the idea; the southern Germans agreed in 41 percent of the cases. This time, the University students also agreed, in 63 percent of the replies, giving one cause to wonder whether they were condemning existing political immaturity, expressing a belief that the great mass of the population cannot ever form independent opinions, or merely expressing their own superiority, as students, to the mass of the population. In the light of these findings, it is significant to review the case studies of the candidates examined at the ICD Screening Center, in order to determine the factors which led to the formation of their political views. Each candidate was asked to state his party affiliations in 1932 and 1933, as well as his political stand during the Nazi period. He was also asked to name the principal influence in the formation of his particular political philosophy. At another point in the interview, each candidate was asked to describe his father and mother, including their political attitudes and his relationship with each parent. Two very enlightening groups of figures emerged from this review. Twenty-one percent of the candidates cited religious considerations as the primary factor which determined their political attitude, leading them to join such parties as the Centrum Partei which was predominantly Catholic. Eleven percent stated that they automatically fell into the ranks of the workers’ parties, such as the Sozial Demokratische Partei Deutschland, because of their social status in the laboring class. Twenty-five percent stated that they had joined one or another of the promilitary or pro-nationalist parties in the wave of exaggerated patriotism and fear of the Left that followed Germany’s defeat in 1918. Nineteen percent stated that the strongest influence in the formation of their views was that of teachers in the various high schools, professors at the universities, or special friendships outside the family circle. However, in comparing the political beliefs of the fathers and the sons in the psychiatric studies, it appeared that the strongest influence in the majority of the cases was the parental. The sons had the same political credos as their fathers in 74 percent of the cases; another 12 percent showed political attitudes which were identical with those of their mothers (in several of these cases, the father was absent from the home, and the mother had assumed the role of authority within the family). Only 7 percent had political attitudes differing from those of both father and mother. The high proportion of similarity between the parents’ political affiliation and that of their offspring would not be surprising in the United States, where there are only two major parties to choose from; but in Germany, where there are ordinarily at least five, and there have been as many as twenty-five distinct political organizations, the high percentage of fidelity on the part of the children to the political ideologies of their parents is the more remarkable. No doubt, strong identification with one’s class or region also plays an important part. The power of the father to preserve the traditional German point of view in his children is also seen in correlating (1) the candidate’s relationship to his parents and (2) his political classification at the Screening Center. Candidates who were members of the Nazi party, or nonmembers who believed in the principles underlying the Nazi platform, were considered “Black.” Those who were not members, but were compromised by their activities in support of the Nazi regime and shared Nazi beliefs to a large extent, were graded “Gray, unacceptable.” Another group, also compromised by their actions during the Nazi period but not subscribers to Nazi doctrine, and hence employable at present in subordinate positions only, were classed “Gray, acceptable.” A “White B” group consisted of those who had shown anti-Nazi tendencies but had not been actively or openly anti-Nazi. The “White A” group represented the clearcut anti-Nazis, who had at one time or another come into opposition to the Nazi regime or suffered at the hands of the Nazis. Among this last group were concentration camp inmates and persons who had been forced to flee the country to save their lives. (See Appendix IV for case histories of each group.) The following table shows the incidence in each group of candidates of those who either (i) gave histories of intellectual and emotional identification with the parents, or (2) showed revolt against parental authority and attitudes.[20] | | Identification | Revolt | | Black | 7 | 0 | | Gray, unacceptable | 5 | 1 | | Gray, acceptable | 14 | 4 | | White B | 18 | 8 | | White A | 22 | 17 | These figures indicate that the incidence of rebels and nonconformists to the family tradition is far greater among the anti-Nazis than among Nazis or Nazi supporters. Among the 39 candidates classified “White A,” there were 10 active anti-Nazis whose resistance against their parents was so strong that it developed into open hostility and they ran away from home. In the combined White A and White B groups, there were 17 active anti-Nazis who had not revolted against their parents; on the contrary, they gave histories of respect for and identification with their parents. On examination, these parents turned out to have been active opponents of political authoritarianism themselves (most frequently members of early socialist groups). The anti-Nazi activities of these candidates evidently did not represent revolt against the parental philosophy, but actual acceptance of it. In the case of H., a Social Democratic party functionary and newspaper editor, his political attitudes were directly taken over from his father. Both his parents were proud that they were members of the working class; his father was a militant member of the Social Democratic Party. When H. was a child, his home was the scene of clandestine meetings of socialist leaders who were planning protests against anti-labor legislation being introduced by Bismarck. His father confided to him the existence of a secret drawer where forbidden socialist papers were kept. H. joined his father’s political group as soon as he was old enough to do so. [20] The size of each group is not to be taken as representative of the size of similar groups in the German population as a whole, since the candidates were a selected group sent to the Screening Center as potential licensees, and the majority of those sent were previously judged to be antiNazi. We cannot therefore assume that resistance to parental authority is the only, or even the commonest precursor of opposition to political traditionalism. It appears that those individuals who learned in their childhood to accept authority in the home later easily accepted the authority of the State; other individuals who learned at an early age to oppose authoritarianism continued to do so. A third group, perhaps less extensive than the other two, remained opposed to authoritarianism in adult life as a result of childhood rebellion against authoritarian parents. ** Why the Nazi Appeal Succeeded With the picture of the German parent, the German child and the German attitudes toward group living in mind, it is instructive to direct one’s attention to several aspects of recent and contemporary German history. From this point of view, one can reexamine the spontaneous reactions of average Germans to two of the major events of the past twenty years: the rise of Nazism inside Germany and the beginning of Allied military occupation of Germany. By comparing responses to these two developments with those which other peoples might have shown, it will be easier to understand what is specifically German about the reactions, and to formulate goals for German reeducation. As seen from the psychological point of view alone, the National Socialist Party was successful in attracting a majority of Germans because its appeal was based upon the traditional emotional patterns and doctrines. In the first place, it adopted a name which was cleverly designed to appeal to as many different groups as possible. The official title of the NSDAP was National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (National Socialist German Workers Party). Use of the word “national” was a direct appeal to all the nationalistic, military-minded, aggressive expansionists, interested in reestablishing Germany as a large, strong country. This gave the party a hold upon the upper classes who had the greatest interest in reviving a powerful Germany with a larger sphere for economic activity and expansion. The second word, “socialist,” was a bid to the liberal groups with a promise of a progressive, moderate, socially minded program, offering economic security. By inserting the word “German,” the party offered every German the opportunity to identify himself once more with the whole German people, to unite with all Germans in the concept of das deutsche Volk. Finally, with the phrase “Workers’ Party,” the Nazis captured the laboring groups. Thus, group susceptibility to labels such as national and socialist and workers’ party was played upon. German political credulity was used to gather all these groups under one fold. A more astute or skeptical population would have sensed the internal contradictions in the name of the party alone. But Germans are psychologically accustomed to belonging to groups with definite labels: a political party which included all the labels made it possible for the majority to belong to a heterogeneous group and still feel homogeneous. The idea of uniting all Germans in one family-like group had a powerful appeal. Second, the Nazi program held before the Germans a model of a state based upon the same principles as the authoritarian family. This was familiar and congenial to the great majority, who felt that the republican form of government, based on nonauthoritarian principles, had been unsuccessful in German hands. Most Germans were easily persuaded to return to an older form of government, based on traditional German concepts. They had been unhappy in the republican system because they disliked the conflict between political parties, just as they had felt anxious at home when their parents disagreed. They had no real insight into the reasons for the failure of the Weimar Republic, but cited as the cause the existence of too many political parties; and instead of choosing a small number of parties which would have produced a more workable political system, they eliminated all parties but one. Unaccustomed as Germans are to criticize or evaluate any authority, it is no wonder that they did not adequately or correctly analyze the deficiencies in the Weimar Republic. Hitler promised them security, work, food and clothing if they would but grant him authority. In effect, he asked them to make themselves his children, and he in return would constitute himself their superfather. To Germans who had been economically insecure under the Republic, this was a welcome suggestion. He asked for confidence in his plans with complete authority for himself and implicit obedience from the German people. To a large percentage of Germans, this was neither absurd nor dangerous but a natural arrangement between a leader and his subjects, a situation to which they had become accustomed from infancy on in their home life, schools, work experience, and military service. Hitler actually appealed not only to those who enjoyed the submissive role in a hierarchical, authoritative system, but also successfully reached the nonauthoritarian, romantic, idealistic portions of the German population (who were chiefly adolescents).[21] In the third place, by describing the woes of the country as due to “dirty” elements in the population (that is, impurities within the family structure) and due also to foreign enemies, Hitler appealed to two fundamental German psychological mechanisms: the love of cleanliness, with its corollary compulsion to cleanse and purify, and to anxiety concerning one’s status based on fear and dislike of the outsider. By giving Germans the opportunity to rid Germany of unclean elements, he gave them profound emotional satisfaction. The drive to make the nation “clean” was so strong that it assumed violent form, crushing all considerations of humanity. Germans derived so much satisfaction from the ejection of “impure” elements in the population and felt so justified in the process that they never stopped to consider the reaction of world opinion to what they were doing. They thought it was a normal, natural procedure. At the same time that Germany was cleaning house, it was making itself strong to ward off attacks from the threatening outsider, Russian Bolschewismus, which Hitler pictured to the German public in every speech. Although Russia had been Germany’s consistent supporter during the period of the Republic and had extensive trade relationships with Germany at that time, Hitler had little difficulty in persuading his countrymen that Bolshevism was a real and fundamental threat to their way of life. He described the Russians as dirty and uncultured, that is, inferior to Germans; he showed them also as powerful and arming themselves for an imminent attack on a culturally superior people, who might be conquered and then lowered to primitive Russian standards. Later he extended this feeling of being threatened from without by Russia to a paranoid fear of nearly every nation in Europe (“encirclement”), giving concrete expression to the typical German fear of all outsiders. [21] This is well described by Erik H. Erikson in his “Hitler’s Imagery and German Youth,” in Psychiatry: Journal of Biology and Pathology of Interpersonal Relations, Vol. V, No. 4, November, 1942. Erikson says in part, “Hitler replaced the complicated conflict of adolescence as it pursued every German, with a simple pattern of hypnotic action and freedom from thought ... diverting all their adolescent energy into National Socialism.” As a matter of record, the Nazi youth ideal was compounded of both desperate adolescent idealism and disciplined, mature conformity to pattern. Fourth, Hitler’s policies, and even his personal behavior in public, met the requirements of the German cult of manliness. His policies were strong and aggressive. He promised to avenge German honor, not by the soft, suspect methods of diplomacy, but with powerful, irresistible tactics. Hitler did not ask permission, he made demands. Hitler did not consult others for advice but relied on his own judgment and wisdom. He did not hesitate or waver; he knew what was to be done and ordered it that way. His bearing and his speeches were belligerent. The tone was positive, the voice loud, the language strong. The settings for Nazi meetings were martial. The Hitler salute itself was an energetic upsweep of the whole arm, symbolizing the powerful elan of German renascence. Hitler’s manner was that of the traditional German father: it inspired confidence, Ehrfurcht and obedience. Like a German father, he proposed to reunite all Germans, Heim ins Reich (back in the family fold). In historical terms, he embodied the legendary qualities of the Barbarossa, awakened from his sleep of centuries, once more ready to lead the German people. Hitler’s reputed private life was also well calculated to appeal to Germans. A life unfettered by marriage and therefore free for heroic service to his country satisfied the requirements of the cult of manliness. Besides, he represented an ideal fixationpoint for the repressed emotions of the German wife and the hero-worship of the German daughter, whose role in the family life is so restricted. Since Hitler had no children of his own, the mass of the people were able to fit into a child-father relationship with him without rivalry from real “children of the father,” who might have had prior or greater claims for his care. As Hitler’s children, they were also able to identify themselves with him, to feel an active share in his power and his status. By his vegetarianism and by his renunciation of smoking and alcoholic beverages, he personified manly self-control, denying himself important oral-erotic satisfactions. Even his final act, his decision to die rather than to live beyond the day of complete German defeat, conformed to the German ideal. ** Denazification Is Not Enough Denazification” is a new word. It originated during the heat of World War II, when the Allies were trying to formulate plans for remaking and reeducating Germany at the end of the war. The original meaning of the word was the systematic removal of Nazi leaders and Nazi thought. It was based upon the erroneous assumption that Nazism was a new, extraneous trend in German thinking, foreign to the majority of the people and imposed upon them by a particular group of identifiable persons. It was assumed that one could seize these Nazis, deprive them of their power, put the main leaders to death, isolate the lesser ones who were irredeemable, and shut off the source of poisonous Nazi vapors. Following this procedure, the people could emerge from the years of oppression under the Nazis, resume their “normal” way of life, and, after a period to allow German thinking to reestablish itself, Germans could again become members of the family of nations. Denazification implied that the majority of Germans, after the military defeat, would be glad to throw off all traces of National Socialism, in order to revert to their own traditions. It was planned to rely on help from the large group who were mature before Hitler seized power, and pictured the youth who had grown up under Hitler, knowing only National Socialism, as the greatest potential danger. The first step in denazification, the removal of Nazi leaders, was a tangible, practical step, relatively easy to carry out. Those top-ranking Nazi chieftains who did not commit suicide or otherwise disappear from sight were apprehended and put on trial in Nurnberg. Every Nazi Party official was automatically subject to arrest; the majority of the SS, the SA, and other Nazi organization functionaries were rounded up and interned. Specific offenders against Allied military personnel and Allied civilians were punished by military courts. Each branch of Military Government was instructed to clear the regional governments of all Nazis. At this stage, “denazify” began to be used in a self-contradictory sense. Nazis were reported to have been “denazified.” This did not mean that they had been converted or educated to a new point of view but merely that they had been removed from their former positions. The fundamental idea in denazification had been narrowed down to the physical removal of Nazi officials. There remained the problem of Nazi thinking. The sources of propaganda were shut off; Nazi literature was no longer available, newspapers no longer printed the Nazi point of view. But what persisted was German. There were still German textbooks and other educational devices for perpetuating the German set of attitudes. Schoolteachers who had been members of the Nazi party were removed from the classrooms; but there were others who had not joined the Party and were still actively teaching the predominant German point of view. Hitler had not interned or exterminated the latter group; they had been allowed to go on teaching all through the Nazi reign. They did not fall under our denazification laws because they had never officially joined or registered with any of the NSDAP organizations. Are they fit to help in the denazification process? One need only ask the question, “Where were the teachers who did not become Party members and who did not have this German point of view?” They were in exile or had been forced into the German Army as common soldiers and were now either prisoners of war or dead. The mere fact that a teacher did not bear the Nazi label or did not have the external manifestations of Nazism of which a diagnosis could have been made did not mean that he was not a subscriber to Nazi-approved doctrine. The fact that he was a good German, politically speaking, did not mean that he was opposed to Nazism. On the contrary, these “good Germans” had been acceptable to the Nazis without formal party membership because fundamentally they believed in the same things. They could go on teaching as they had always done without coming into conflict or disagreement with the Nazis. These teachers had been transmitting traditional German thought in the days of the Kaiser, later under the President of the German Republic, then under Hitler, and now, because of the strict interpretation of denazification laws, could go right on teaching under the auspices of Allied Military Government for the simple reason that they didn’t possess an incriminating Party membership card. The identity of the principles underlying Nazi doctrine and traditional German doctrine was not recognized by Military Government when it first began to use the word denazification. It was taken for granted that National Socialism was something alien, not in the main stream of German history. Because of this artificial separation, the American public debated whether the Nazis alone or the whole German people were guilty of starting the war. It should have been recognized that Nazism was only the contemporary, extreme, political expression of German thought and that the two were fundamentally the same.[22] If they had been different, there would have been more reason for opposition to National Socialism. That widespread opposition to Hitler did not take place is not to be ascribed simply to the efficiency of the Gestapo. [22] The theoretical basis for this statement had already been clearly formulated in Regularities in German National Character, prepared by the Round Table Conference on “Germany after the War,” 1944. When the candidates at the Screening Center were asked to complete the sentence, The reason for the weakness of the German underground movement was ... , only 3 3 percent blamed the terroristic methods of the Gestapo and the German security police; 67 percent replied in this vein: 1. the majority of Germans, including even the workers, were entirely won over to Hitler and gave complete, abject service to him and to his plans. 2. it had no definite aims. 3. the absence, and lack of preparation, of any opposition. 4. they lacked a national motive. 5. the innate instinct to obey the orders of the State. 6. the widespread inferiority complex of the German people. 7. the convinced anti-Nazis had all emigrated. 8. lack of response from the German people. 9. centuries-old lack of Zivilkourage (civilian courage). 10. the majority was behind Hitler. 11. there was no agreement as to what change was desired. 12. due to absence of help from outside Germany. 13. fear of betrayal by the German people. 14. the superficiality of opposition to the Nazis. 15. we lacked capable men who could establish a program. It would appear that the Nazi ideology was not unpalatable to the majority of Germans. National Socialism was not a revolution in German life but a continuation and intensification of the traditional approach to life. If this is true, can denazification solve the problem? Can the removal of the Nazi top layer, even the removal of all those who wore Party insignia, all the fellow travelers and the profiteers under the Nazis, do more than remove the Nazi label from German thinking? Will it affect German thinking at all? Will it change the belief in authoritarianism, in discipline as opposed to freedom? Will it change the concepts of the rights of individuals and of the relative status of men and women? Will it change the German people from literal, legalistic thinkers into humanitarians believing in the worth and dignity of other individuals and other nationals? Could denazification alone ever have been expected to make Germans ready for democracy? Denazification was evidently a misnomer for the real intentions of the victors. The word has confined attention to the contemporary period. It has led to the acceptance of the fallacy that the believers in National Socialist doctrines could be identified as a relatively small, discrete group. It is basically dangerous because it fails to point out the fundamental organic relationship between Nazism and Germanism, and the fact that National Socialism was a sequential growth out of German culture. If Germany is merely denazified, no basic change will be accomplished. ** Anti-Nazis Are Germans Too The majority of the anti-Nazis studied at the ICD Screening Center showed predominant German attitudes in every field not strictly related to the question of National Socialism, such as German culture, family relationships, the status of women, education of youth, discipline, personal freedom and civil liberties, and art expression. Though they were able to see defects and dangers in the Nazi system as such, they did not see the connection between these defects and characteristic German behavior in other areas of human relationships. They had a blind spot for the parallel manifestations in German mores and German social structure. Therefore it cannot be taken for granted that opponents of National Socialism in Germany were anti-Nazi for the same reasons that Americans, British, Russians, and Frenchmen were anti-Nazi. The mere fact that a German fought the Nazi regime does not mean that he fought for the sake of the same principles that Americans and Frenchmen were defending. Nor does it follow that a new German government, run by men with established anti-Nazi records, will be a democratic one. The blind spot was less often present in the case of liberals and anti-Nazis who had returned to Germany after living abroad for eight or ten years, and who had had a chance to compare German life with that in other countries. But such cases form a pitiful minority among the anti-Nazis who are available for appointment to positions of leadership and influence in Germany. The men and women who are politically cleared, and who will lead German thought for the next generation, are not aware of the very factors in German personal and family lives which make for authoritarianism, intolerance, distrust, aggression and rigidity in their national behavior. This carefully selected group, the cream of intellectual and political leadership available for placement, does not grasp the special significance of German education in forming traits which the rest of the world considers a threat to international relations and peace. The tragedy is that unless one can find a more sophisticated and politically developed group, or unless Germans develop a new group of leaders of their own, the reeducation program will have to be entrusted to men and women with blind spots for the tendencies that other nations would most like to see disappear from German behavior patterns. The probability of speedy retraining of these Germans is small. They are mostly mature men and women. Psychiatric study showed in them a very high degree of psychological rigidity, with moderate to great resistance against democratic formulations of individual development in family life. Though one may speculate that the rigidity is attributable in part to their experiences during the last twelve years, one must not forget the general German tendency to adhere to the accepted system, and the lack of insight into this trait. If this selected group cannot be modified, and must be used as teachers and leaders, can the responsibility for German reeducation safely be placed in their hands? If not, we have to recognize there is a necessity for active Allied participation in the reeducation program. An incident connected with the youth meetings held in Bad Homburg during the summer of 1946 clearly illustrates some of the problems involved in modifying an alien culture. At that time, Military Government began to permit meetings of Germans for purposes of political discussion and education. Special emphasis was placed on getting young men and women, from 15 to 22, to participate. The meetings were to be observed, and, if need be, led by Americans. In Bad Homburg, the group which applied for an American to serve as discussion leader was found to consist not only of young Germans but of adults as well. The adults were mostly the parents of the young Germans, with a scattering of teachers, school principals, and ministers. They were first cleared politically by Military Intelligence, which found that all had clean records. They had opposed Nazism because of liberal or progressive political attitudes and had refused to join any Nazi organizations; but none had been actively engaged in any resistance movement, or had been placed in a concentration camp because of open opposition to the Nazis. They were the so-called “passive anti-Nazis.” The first meeting began with a short paper on “Authority and Freedom,” prepared by an eighteen-year-old high school student. He did a rather able job of reporting American attitudes, which he knew only through the medium of books written about America. He described the American esteem for the value of the individual, for freedom from restraint in the presence of elders or superiors, and for the right to question authority. He spoke of the free man’s responsibility to moderate his freedom out of respect for the freedom of other individuals. He ended with advice to German youth to examine ideas before accepting them, instead of merely imitating one’s superiors and obeying orders without question. The young people indicated their approval, and seemed to understand what he was trying to express. Only a few spoke, generally in agreement, and a few of the students asked questions. The older generation reacted quickly and vigorously. A schoolteacher asked the group how one could be expected to conduct a class if students felt free to question the instruction; it would be embarrassing. A school superintendent delivered a long speech, full of quotations from the German classics, Kant and Goethe; he emphasized over and over that youth had much to learn and assimilate, before it could be in a position to question. He warned that the experience of one’s elders cannot be properly evaluated by young people, and should therefore not be cast aside. He did his best to undermine the youths’ confidence in their own ability to reach decisions without help, and asked them to continue to come to the authorities for the answers. The parents said feelingly that there had been too much liberty for children and adolescents during the Nazi period, and that they wanted a restoration of “decent” family life and a return to respect for one’s parents and authority! Not one of the younger generation got up to reply. From that moment on, they no longer even took part in the discussion. The older generation had very easily won the debate, if one could call it such. The democratic point of view had held the floor barely fifteen minutes, only to be choked out by the same adults who had organized the discussion group, in the name of German reeducation, to stamp out Nazism and prepare the youth for a different world. The following day, the American observer asked the organizers of the meeting to divide the group into two so that the youth could meet separately from the adults. The parents were visibly upset by the suggestion, some even indignant. Was there any doubt in the observer’s mind that they were anti-Nazis, who had suffered for being faithful to liberal ideals all through the Hitler regime? Weren’t they the obvious choice to instruct youth, the youth which had been poisoned during twelve years of Hitler rule? Was it not fitting and proper that they should be present, to supervise the reeducation of their own children? To whom should the children turn, if not to their parents? And could children be expected to arrive at any sound, valid conclusions on these difficult problems, if there were no grown-ups present? It was the traditional German point of view. The American observer then sounded out the younger members of the discussion group. Two of them, the young man who had presented the paper, and a young woman whose parents were schoolteachers, had already sensed the situation and were taken aback by the turn of events at the meeting. They reported that most of the other youths and girls had suddenly lost their enthusiasm for political discussion; some had even developed feelings of anxiety lest there be reactions against them at home and in school. The two young leaders tried to defend the presence of the elder group on only one score: they felt it was the only possible situation to be devised, in which the authority of the parents and teachers could be challenged. But they admitted that, face to face with the school principal, the group had been unable to break away from their usual attitude of deference and Ehrfurcht before authority. Rather than give up discussion groups altogether, it was decided to try a compromise of two discussions a week, one meeting exclusively for youth and one joint meeting, (the latter obviously a bow to the wishes of the older group). Though the disadvantages of the joint meeting were obvious to them, the young Germans were unable to shake off old patterns completely, and remained afraid to meet by themselves, even though they had already demonstrated some capacity to ask fundamental questions and to think independently. Before the first all-youth meeting was arranged, the parents returned to the American observer, bringing some of the younger group in tow. The parents did all the speaking; the youth stood behind them, listening and dejected. “We are still afraid to let the children meet all by themselves,” the parents began. The “children” ranged in age from 15 to 22! “They get all the wrong influences today. Germany is still Nazi at heart. Nothing they hear is democratic. If we don’t stay near to know what they are talking about, how can we be sure that they won’t follow the wrong path, some other wicked ideology?” It seemed superfluous to point out that the parents would hear nothing at all when the youth could not speak freely in front of them. “Education is a family matter, which you Americans probably do not understand about us Germans.” The adults also used the argument that they needed the younger generation to help free the parents of false values. This was undoubtedly true, but the chances of joint meetings resulting in mutual education were slim at best. The parents could not grasp the fact that younger persons would inevitably be dominated and suppressed within the authoritarian setting. Even these relatively enlightened, politically anti-Nazi, benevolent adult Germans suffered from the blind spot, and were unfit to educate young Germans in democracy. The final result was that the Bad Homburg discussion group decided on its own to continue joint meetings, and the subsequent “discussions” remained discourses by the older group, with the younger members present as a silent audience. They were a travesty of what they were intended to be. On the other hand, only fifty miles away from Bad Homburg at the University of Marburg, there were highly successful political discussions. Here only students were eligible to attend. Their parents were all at some distance, and the university professors were not invited. That these discussions accomplished part of their purpose can be deduced from the differences cited above in answers to questions given in the survey of 2,000 Germans. The reason for the success of the Marburg discussion group does not lie in its internal unity, but in the fact that it was not a typical German group and in its escape from the German authoritarian pattern. Parents, school principals, ministers, and university professors were eliminated. There is one other group to consider: If passive anti-Nazis are still basically German and are generally not capable of reeducating Germans, what about the active anti-Nazis, the aggressive opponents of Nazism who refused to make any compromise at all with Hitler, and either landed in concentration camps or had to emigrate from Germany? Are they freer from German cultural traits? A group of concentration camp survivors (fifteen in number) were examined at the ICD Screening Center. On the whole the responses of this group revealed the smallest number of prevalent German attitudes, as well as fairly clear conceptions of authoritarian traits and similar dangers in the German training and an active rebellion against the narrow German way of life. But, unfortunately, psychiatric interviews and Rorschach personality studies revealed considerable psychological damage in these individuals because of their experiences. Several were “burnt out,” no longer energetic or aggressive, unable or unwilling to take up the struggle again. They said they wished to live out the rest of their lives as peacefully and quietly as possible. Some showed disabling neurotic features, which were represented in the Rorschach replies by frequent references to blood and anatomic dismemberment, and marked delays in response to color. It would appear that those concentration camp inmates who managed to survive the war had made an adjustment to the life of internment on a simpler emotional plane than before, and were unable to revert to the former degree of active opposition. Probably those who had refused to compromise and continued to struggle did not live to see the end of the war. Besides, the actual number of concentration camp survivors in Germany is so small as to be wholly inadequate, from a practical point of view, to take over the burden of reeducation, even if they were carefully and wisely distributed in vital places in the educational system. Finally there is a possible source of educators and cultural leaders to be found among those who fled from Germany for political reasons and among those who left at an early age to save their lives. The latter, now usually citizens of other countries, exposed to non-German points of view, are mostly still able to speak the mother tongue and are interested in the problems of the mother country. They have had a new perspective on its institutions. Having had experience with both German and non-German ways of life, they should be in a position to make constructive comparisons. Two important facts operate to keep these emigres from being as useful as they might: the first is the natural tendency to stay away from Germany. The return of able editors, writers, and professors has been minimal. Most of them made a definite and painful break with the past when they left—painful because they were educated to and had accepted the German cultural patterns. Now they are fairly well adjusted to the countries of their adoption and see little reason to give up their new lives to return to the hardships of living in a ruined country. Men who have once been freed from German authoritarianism and have become aware of its essential quality would not easily or voluntarily return to live under its restrictions and regulations. Even if they were willing to go back, it is doubtful if they themselves are sufficiently modified, or sufficiently aware intellectually of their own German character-structure, to be able to teach other Germans a different approach to human values and relationships. Former Germans who have returned to work for Military Government have mentioned the difficulty of resisting a return to old behavior patterns, despite the best of intentions. It requires enormous self-knowledge and self-control to withstand the flattering, obsequious behavior of Germans toward Allied officials, and many ex-Germans as well as Americans unconsciously fall into the easy authoritarian system in dealings with Germans. In addition, Germans themselves tend to reject the intellectual guidance they could receive from former Germans. They object to the repatriates on the grounds that “they don’t know us well enough any more to help us; they didn’t suffer with us during the dictatorship and the terrors of war; how can they come back and try to tell us what we need or what we should do?” Undoubtedly what they really mean, and few admit it, is that these former Germans have been alienated and are now outsiders, no longer entitled to authority in the old family circle. They have come back to preach a new set of customs of which the Germans are afraid. The Germans cannot forget that they themselves forced the emigres to flee, and now suspect that they have returned interested only in revenge cloaked by talk of reform. Who then is left to carry out the work of reeducation? We have had to discount the passive anti-Nazi with his subconscious, unchanged authoritarianism and his blind spot for German mores. There are not enough anti-Nazis, nor sufficiently active ones, who survived the concentration camps. Germans themselves refuse to learn from returned Germans; and there are reasonable doubts about the ability of ex-Germans to teach them. If reeducation is to be accomplished, it appears to be necessary for non-Germans to assume the major responsibility at this time or at least until a different generation of Germans educated to a new set of values can take over the job themselves. ** Is There Hope for German Youth? It is generally assumed in the United States that the generation of young Germans who were between seven and ten years old when Hitler came to power, who received their entire education in Nazi schools, are poisoned beyond redemption. Political thinkers have asserted that Hitler Youth groups would show the greatest resistance to change among all contemporary Germans, the older groups being theoretically more amenable because they were less thoroughly saturated with the National Socialist doctrine. Many Americans who saw either the theater or film version of Tomorrow the World came away with a clear-cut impression of a definite Hitler Youth product: a brutal, aggressive child-monster, obsessed with the Nazi ideology, insensitive to reason, but nevertheless capable of undergoing a rapid conversion to democracy if the right approach were used. It is important to ascertain whether this is the true picture. Tomorrow the World did not provide a completely satisfactory answer to the problem of reeducating such a Hitler Youth. In the first place, every Hitler Youth cannot be isolated from his environment and be given individual therapy. Nor can each child be transported to the United States for retraining, as was the child in the play. Besides, the picture of Hitler Youth given in the play is neither complete nor true today. The driving force behind Hitlerism and the social sanctions for the Hitler Youth are gone. With the defeat and disappearance of the National Socialist regime, the raison d’etre of the youth movement has vanished. It had been too closely associated with Hitler personally to continue after he and his government disappeared. The totality of the defeat has affected even this lowest organization in the Nazi hierarchy, leaving a sense of failure and demoralization. The emotional basis for the Hitlerjugend was its subservience and devotion to the will of the Fuehrer. Hitler, alive and still holding out a promise of victory, was a satisfying figure to German youth; once his downfall and the shame and defeat had become realities, he was repudiated and held to blame for everything. He had turned out to be neither omnipotent, omniscient, nor omnipresent; he had been a poor father to his people and to the Hitler Youth. “Er hat uns belogen und betrogen” (He lied to us and betrayed us) was the most frequent comment of those who had had the deepest faith in him and now suffered the greatest disillusionment. It is especially significant that so many of the Hitler Youth gave away or otherwise disposed of the daggers that had been a symbol of the movement’s warrior aims and its rugged manliness. To German anti-Nazi parents the six-inch knife worn openly by the youngsters was a constant unpleasant reminder that their children recognized a greater authority than their own. There was, of course, more than one influence that caused the children to give up the highly valued Dolch: the desire to placate souvenir-hunting Allied troops, the need to trade something of value for food or clothing, and the ban on possession of dangerous weapons. But the significant point is that so long as National Socialism still flourished, these daggers were treasured and potent possessions and that after the defeat they lost their emotional value. They were not hidden away against a future rebirth of Nazism; they were given away. In a few striking cases, the blade was mutilated, the tip purposely broken off and the cutting edges deeply nicked. The once proud symbol was attacked and defaced because it now represented defeat and disgrace. A number of candidates at the Screening Center believed that in 1945 older Germans would have shown an equivalent outburst of feeling against all German institutions in the form of a violent civil war, similar to that in 1918, and that this was prevented only by the swift advance of the Allied armies in the last few weeks of the war. This tendency to punish unsuccessful leaders and to treat them as scapegoats should not be confused with genuine efforts at social revolution. It apparently occurs only after military defeat and is an expression of revenge rather than an attempt to destroy old forms in order to introduce new ones. It is usually taken for granted that the doctrines drilled into Hitler youths and girls would remain a permanent part of their thinking. This may prove true of those now over twenty-five, who served in the German army and whose ideas are less flexible as a result of the intensity of their experiences. But what about the group born between 1925 and 1945, who are not over twenty-one years old today? Are the ideas and emotional patterns of these adolescents and post-adolescents also fixed? Can they still be intact after the society in which they were fostered has been destroyed and discredited? ICD studies of Hitler youths tend to show that, though their ideas have as yet undergone only moderate changes, their emotions are in a state of flux, varying widely in response to events and local influences. This generation is emotionally at loose ends, for the time being. On a purely theoretical basis, one could postulate that German youth today is searching for a new father-symbol, a new leader, and a new set of beliefs. They are acutely conscious of having fallen from a favored position to a dismally low one, materially as well as socially. Like other young people, they yearn to live a protected, normal life in a country which can assure them an ordinary chance of raising their standard of living. That this is actually the case was shown in the sociological studies of Dr. David Rodnick.[23] However, it is not the whole story. He also inquired what form young Germans want their next government to take. Dr. Rodnick got the impression that they have not chosen any radically new system, but still lean toward a strong central government, with benevolent, paternal, socialistic tendencies, which will make minimal demands on them for participation in political actions. Fortunately their ideas are by no means crystallized; unfortunately they have not yet received more systematic and thorough exposure to democratic ideas and feelings. So far, only one force plays an important role in their thinking along sociopolitical lines, and it is negative. This is the punitive aspect of Military Government. Germans know that any attempt to teach the old National Socialist beliefs or to revive and reorganize the Hitler Youth will be severely punished. Even if they wished, however, to look backwards, they realize that the past has been too completely demolished to permit much hope of its revival or, even if it were revived, to expect much from it very soon. [23] “Some Frustrations in German Culture,” March, 1946 (unpublished manuscript). A few young Germans even refuse to think about politics at all. This is partly their reaction against the overwhelmingly political complexion of life in Nazi days and also part of the general conception each German has of himself as a kleiner Mensch (a little man) who cannot take individual responsibility for the events of the day which are being maneuvered by the “bigger men.” Despite the love of Germany that was drilled into them in their childhood, young Germans do not feel committed to a Germany which at present offers them so little to build on. A very considerable number of them actually wish to leave the country, because they want the opportunity to live ordinary, satisfying lives. To be sure, feelings of national superiority still crop up in their discussions of various European and Asiatic cultures, but national pride is no longer sufficiently satisfying for those young enough to have normal life spans ahead of them and who wish to live them out in relative ease and comfort. These young Germans would prefer to migrate to North and South America, Australia, or Africa in large numbers if they could. Conditions in Germany are so desperate that they do not feel bound to remain in the Vaterland. Although they know they cannot emigrate at the present time, they do not like to believe it. It is perhaps to be regretted that younger, more impressionable Germans cannot be allowed to study for a year or two outside of Germany. Dr. David Levy, in a study of factors which tend to produce anti-Nazis and other atypical Germans, noted the frequency with which a period of residence abroad profoundly changed German attitudes. This was also shown during World War II in the general educational projects carried out in the United States among German prisoners of war (at Fort Getty and elsewhere). These projects produced a number of men with considerably modified viewpoints, who are now back in Germany contributing their small share to reeducation. Unfortunately the special Getty project was limited in size and did not affect a really significant number. What can be said about German youth today? They have in general repudiated the National Socialist regime as it was, though they would like to retain some of its features in a future government. They have stripped themselves of the superficial insignia and trappings of National Socialism because these are now the symbols of frustration and defeat. But because they are basically German in their attitudes, they have an unfulfilled need for a substitute for the lost father-symbol. This may lead them to support a new authoritarian government whether of German origin or not. In all probability they will not be able, without skillful and patient help, to strip themselves of the emotional authoritarian patterns and traditions in which they have been reared since early childhood. ** The American Soldier as Educator I f the democratic way of life is ever to get a trial in Germany, the basis of the social structure will have to be altered. If bombs had been able to blast authoritarianism as devastatingly as they pulverized German cities, the reconstruction assignment would be much simpler. What has been accomplished so far is the defeat of the army, the removal of Nazi leaders, the dissolution of the Nazi party, and the establishment of a military government as the new authority. The hardest job is yet to be done. In terms of individual psychology, it has hardly even been defined. That is, the reorienting of German thought. During the first year of the occupation, there was a fairly good beginning at surveying the problem. For the first time in German history, the country was systematically examined at close range by non-Germans. The Surveys Section of American Military Government’s ICD made continuous, detailed investigations of national opinion. It found out what Germans think about current events and various current problems such as food rations, the return of prisoners of war, clothing supplies, foreign movies, the question of war guilt, and the United Nations. It gathered the material needed to understand the people as a whole and as individuals. American economic experts know more about German industry now than they know about their own. American anthropologists such as Rodnick and Lipkin have made detailed studies of life in smaller German communities. Psychiatrists like Dr. David M. Levy have initiated studies in German family relationships and their bearing on the formation of political attitudes. The material has been gathered. But what has so far been done with it? Has it been used to implement a rational, realistic program of reeducation? In attempting to answer this question, let us review the history of American influence on the German mentality since the war’s end. The first American to have any direct contact with Germans, the first in a position to disseminate a set of different ideas, was the soldier. In general, he never had access to the material that was being gathered; he had to remain an amateur educator at best. Even if he had been better informed, he was at first officially discouraged from mingling with the population at all through the non-fraternization laws. Besides, he displayed an alarming tendency to admire the Germans for their cleanliness and their industry and to forget their defects and why he had come to fight them. Even if he had been officially encouraged to try to teach them democracy, he usually could not speak German; and, though he could quickly acquire a smattering of the language, he rarely learned enough to handle the intricacies of political discussion. Nevertheless, the mere presence of American soldiers and officers on German soil, in full sight of the population, might have had some positive educational value. Germans did not need to understand English to see the difference between the behavior of the occupying army and their own. They observed with wonderment, even disbelief, the relationship between officers and enlisted men. Usually the first German comment was an expression of astonishment at the ease, the directness, and the lack of ceremony with which Americans carried on official army business. This observation was important because it struck at the heart of their traditional organization of life. For the first time, a large number of ordinary Germans had before their eyes a demonstration of the democratic contempt for servility, and the attempt to treat all men as individuals with equal rights. They could compare for themselves American soldiers and the German Landser, who report to their officers with a clicking of the heels, stand stiff as a board (strammstehen), give an exaggerated salute, and announce their readiness to receive orders in a loud, unnatural tone of voice (a tone also used by their officers in issuing orders). American soldiers take orders with a minimum of ritual: in strict German military circles, a soldier does not turn and walk away from the officer when he has received an order but backs out to the door, tense and “respectful” until the door is closed in front of him. Contrast this, as the Germans do, with the American private’s casual salute and smile, his composure, and his interest in the job he has been given to do. Such simple scenes can make a profound impression, and there is no doubt that they did have some effect in the early days of the occupation. Germans have already observed that there is something essentially different about human relationships in democratic society, even the military part of it. They commonly ask, “How did your army conquer the magnificent, highly trained German army, without disciplined They prefer to believe that only superiority in supplies made the victory possible. But now that the ideas of discipline and defeat of their army are linked in German minds, the discipline of the army and the caste system on which it is based have come into question; there is a nascent wonder whether such a system is necessary. German lawyers coming into contact with American military courts have seen that one can conduct the business of the court legally and efficiently, without the formalities and the subservience German officials demand. Civilians have commented on the freedom in social relations, the fact that Americans do not bow during introductions, that they do not constantly emphasize differences in social or professional status. In merely being present on German soil, even without intimate social relationships with its people, Allied soldiers had an opportunity to open the way for a change in German life. In the first year of the occupation, the Germans had ample opportunities to study them, to examine their ways. Unconsciously they began to adapt themselves to new customs and to imitate the conqueror, that is, typically they began to follow the patterns of the new authority in the land. Unfortunately, American troops were not always good examples for them to follow. They were not all good advertisements for democracy. There was considerable lawlessness and lack of self-control among American soldiers after the end of the war. There was brutality as well as generosity. Besides, troops were shifted around inside Germany so frequently that those soldiers who did wish to exert a democratic influence could not do so over a long enough period of time in any one community. Subsequently, the lowering of the age-level of the occupation troops reduced the number of mature Americans with whom Germans could come in contact. The group with the best capacity for influencing Germans came to be made up of civilian employees of the War Department who volunteered to stay on for one and two-year periods. But these Americans live in compounds, rather effectively isolated from the majority of the population. The one group officially devoted to reeducation is the Religion and Education Division of Military Government, but it is unfortunately very small. There is always a handful of soldiers, able to speak German and interested in problems of reeducation, who unofficially offer their services to lead group discussions, such as were described in a previous section of this book. Lacking any detailed directives, American soldiers and American civilians in Germany have generally had to work out their own attitudes toward the Germans, each according to his own background and character. The resulting picture has been confusing to Germans who understandably spend a large portion of their time studying the strangers who now rule their land, trying to discern an “orderly” plan and system in the program of the occupation authorities. The American attitude toward the handling of German civilians as people, quite apart from the official Military Government policy on reeducation, has been indefinite and unclear to both the soldiers and the Germans. Americans wanted to be considered conquerors but also humane; the Germans could not conceive of them as humane and also conquerors. As for the American side of the picture, the front-line fighter had little choice of attitude; when he crossed the border into Germany, every German was still his enemy. The rear echelon troops who followed in the wake of the infantrymen and had the first real contact with German civilians found them mostly tired and apathetic, glad the worst of the fighting was over, and hoping to escape further violence. The German civilians were for the most part obsequious and obedient; a few were even helpful. However, the rear echelon troops were too busy restoring order and rebuilding utilities to study the people or to deal with them as individuals. General Eisenhower had addressed the population in the name of his troops, saying, “We come as conquerors, not as oppressors.” This signified something different to the Germans than it would have to a similar civilian group in the United States, or to the American soldier. The latter had been trained since childhood to be kind to others, especially to women, children, and old folk. It would not have occurred to him to be cruel, especially deliberately, to the women or old folk who made up the bulk of the populace left in the towns and villages that had been overrun. However, Eisenhower’s statement introduced into his mind the idea that he must somehow temper a soldier’s natural feelings of vindictiveness, that he must modify the desire to punish the enemy who had begun this war. Usually he had no objection to this formulation, since it also fitted in with another feeling he had: while the war was still on, there was a danger lest Americans might inadvertently absorb some “Nazi” attitudes if they used the Nazis’ own methods. Thus the American soldier was adjusting himself to peacetime relationships with Germans, preparing to treat German civilians firmly but humanely. During the same period, Germans were also modifying their attitudes, but in a characteristically German direction. They concluded not only that Americans were to be obeyed and treated with respect, but that they need not be feared. They also expected the Americans to play a familiar role in their lives— that of the usual German father. The American Army of Occupation was no longer a threatening outsider or an alien tribe, but had been symbolically transformed into an authoritarian figure, and therefore a comforting one: the strict but benevolent father, returning home to punish bad children for their misbehavior and to reestablish the accepted order in the family. Americans had ousted Hitler, who had proved to be a poor father; they were now taking over the position of authority left vacant by him and were planning to carry out the obligations expected of a good father. This meant that the Americans would restate the ideals, set an example, support the children materially, provide food and clothing, and expect only subservience and obedience in return. This German conception was obviously quite different from that of the American soldiers, who had been mentally prepared to assume power over a defeated people and to rule them. They were ready to be fair and just in administration, but were far from ready to be benevolent toward a recent enemy, giving him material support. This would have seemed to be actually rewarding the enemy for his past crimes and cruelties. If Americans had grasped the German state of mind immediately after the war, with its readiness to institute reforms in return for help in reconstruction, or had been emotionally prepared to act upon such an understanding of it, a program of reform and reeducation could have been begun much sooner. The Germans were ideally receptive then, at the very end of hostilities, because of the vacuum left by the complete destruction of the Nazi regime and the German need to lean on some authority. But the occupation troops in 1945 were too much under the influence of the final Nazi propaganda about werewolves and underground resistance against the Allies. They felt too insecure on German soil to want to do more at that time than establish the occupation safely inside Germany. They were not prepared to change from warriors to teachers. As a result, the program of reeducation was postponed till the end of the period of demilitarization and denazification (roughly, the spring of 1946). By this time, the ideal moment for instituting an active program of German reorientation was past. The people had had a chance to recover from the initial shock of defeat and destruction. The injury to their national pride was being glossed over with new and subtle forms of nationalism, such as the following statements: “No country in history has ever been tested by fire and come through it the way Germany has”; “Despite her defeat, Germany is still the center of the world, the bridge between East and West”; “Germany alone holds the key to peace in Europe.” Germans began to feel important again even though defeated; therefore, the urgency of self-analysis and revision vanished. In June, 1945, they were blaming themselves and criticizing their own government. By June, 1946, they were directing their criticisms toward their conquerors. Their abject submission had given way to the old arrogance, inwardly if not always outwardly, because the occupation authorities had failed to live up to the German conception of a father who insisted upon Ehrfurcht from his children. Perhaps one of the reasons why Americans were hesitant in deciding to teach democracy in Germany was that they had inner conflicts over democracy at home. Americans had come to Europe in the name of a militant democracy. They had announced that Germany could regain her old position in the family of nations when her people had become truly democratic. But it was hard to explain feelings about democracy in words. One could point to a republican form of government, a democratic philosophy of abiding by the will of the majority, a democratic attitude toward one’s fellow men. Yet not every facet of American life was democratic. Americans could not hide their treatment of the Negro soldier. They were naturally sensitive to the inevitable criticisms of the American way of life, and, needless to say, the Germans had been well armed with criticisms by the Nazis. Soldiers were repeatedly asked, “What really is your democracy?” It was difficult for enthusiastic but still amateur educators to put across their ideals of emotional maturity and individual freedom, with the attendant group responsibilities that are considered essential to democracy. It was difficult to admit that democracy in the United States is still far from complete or perfect. These were trying experiences for American soldiers when challenged to justify every phase of American life on democratic principles. It was likewise embarrassing to attempt to justify, on the same basis, all the actions of the Military Government. The soldier might conscientiously try to make his own actions a consistent witness to democracy, only to find himself defeated by the exigencies of military rule, and his high purpose brought down to little more than a token show. Americans who were aware of what Germans were thinking knew how great the disappointment was. They knew, also, that Germans expect to be taught the rules to live by. Naturally this was impossible; democracy cannot be taught by simple, rigid rules. The Germans were further disappointed because they expected that material conditions would be quickly restored to normal and that the occupation authorities would relieve them of all responsibility for government. Obviously economic improvement could not be brought about at once. Lack of adequate material support was an inevitable consequence of the world-wide disruption of supplies and transportation. Moreover, there was a natural impulse to aid Germany’s victims before rehabilitating Germany itself. There was also an understandable fear lest Germany regain physical strength before achieving intellectual and political reorientation. Americans could not follow the authoritarian German pattern. It was basically repugnant to be asked to bargain with the Germans, promising them material help in return for becoming democratically minded. One could concede humanely that men cannot think calmly and rationally about political and social matters when they are hungry and cold, but Americans could not accept the idea that they should supply Germany’s material needs in return for her internal reform. Yet, in actuality, because of their emotional patterning, Germans did unconsciously tend to think in such terms. That this attitude was later modified is apparent from Paragraph i of the U.S. State Department’s policy on German Reeducation, released in August, 1946. It reads as follows: “The re-education of the German people can be effective only as it is an integral part of a comprehensive program for their rehabilitation. The cultural and moral re-education of the nation must, therefore, be related to policies calculated to restore the stability of a peaceful German economy and to hold out hope for the ultimate recovery of national unity and self-respect.” It is to be regretted that this conclusion was not reached a year earlier, when the German frame of mind was more receptive. Germans have tended to judge the occupying powers only partly in terms of the political philosophy each has to offer. To a very considerable degree, they also judge each of the powers by the effort it is willing to take to restore industry and trade, and to preserve Germany’s pre-war boundaries. The Allies’ more or less conscious recognition of this basis for comparison creates the danger of competition between the occupying nations, to play the part of the protective “father” most successfully and thereby win over the German population. In the field of political reeducation, the Allies compete on unequal terms to start with, because German estimates of the respective Allies differ rather profoundly. To judge from the opinions expressed, it is possible that the French will have relatively little success in propagating ideas within Germany. Though Germans generally admire French artistic ability and sophistication, they have been taught to scorn the French way of life. They consider the French inferior to themselves. Their stereotyped conception is that the French are “dirty,” lazy, inefficient. In the case of the Russians, Germans are fearful and suspicious; they think of the Russians as culturally primitive and aggressive. As for Americans, there is respect for their mechanization, efficiency in production, material wealth, and ideal of “cleanliness,” which resembles the German ideal. But they find Americans politically confused and confusing, and from too “young” a culture to serve as teachers of an older one. The intricacies of American political methods appear disorderly to the German mind; the suggestion that they should follow such examples, in the name of democracy, fills them with anxiety. The pattern does not fit the requirements of a German family ruled by a father who decides all issues, prohibits criticism, and resents questioning. The English, on the other hand, make a different impression. This may be partly due to the fact that Germans think of the English as part of their own family, through ties of blood and culture. There are enough similarities between German and English patterns to permit recognition of the English as relatives, not outsiders. Some Germans even think of themselves as England’s “poor relations.” In general, they admire the English, who were successful in colonizing an empire and in keeping it together, and have been successful in waging war. They are jealous of the calmness and confidence of the English as individuals, and the freedom from the bitter frictions that have characterized German private and public life. They respect the English for having held for so long a position of authority among the nations. Knowledge of these attitudes toward the individual Allies may not increase confidence in eventual success in Germany, but it can offer valuable clues to the workings of the German mind. Americans have been slow in defining the goals of German reeducation until recently because of lack of information on how the German mind reacts habitually, and because of inner conflicts, and because of indecision about the methods to be used. Whether we are to succeed in Germany or not, depends not only upon the goals set but also on the expertness of understanding of the Germans (and ourselves) and the care with which we apply what we have learned. ** Goals and Possibilities The question of the proper goal of reeducation in Germany has been approached from many angles and has produced many proposed solutions. The variety of proposals is dismaying, as might be expected from the battery of historians and professional soldiers, geographers and geopoliticians, statesmen and political scientists, and sociologists and anthropologists who contribute them. Perhaps a psychiatrist ought not to be adding to the confusion by offering his own special observations. However, since the question is still open to deliberation and since final decisions are still a matter for discussion, it is possible that contributions which can be made through techniques in the analysis of personal problems may shed some light on age-old problems in the field of current history. The psychiatrist may be able to draw helpful comparisons between interpersonal and international relationships. I do not wish to suggest that a psychiatrist can set himself up as a therapist to the given psychiatric “patient,” in this case Germany, especially when that “patient” numbers well over sixty million individuals. I do not believe that individual Germans should be regarded as suffering from a national form of mental disease, and therefore requiring mass psychiatric care. I do not imply that Germans as a group are suffering from any mental illness. I have not been describing “disease” in German personal and family life, but those standard aspects of everyday behavior which Germans consider acceptable and normal and healthy. These are the characteristics to be found in Germans who are well adjusted to the society in which they live, and happy in it. Only the deviant, who will not or cannot accept these codes, is unhappy in the German environment. What I should like to state, as a psychiatrist, is that I believe the problem which Germans present to the rest of the Western world is in large part due to the difference in their personality and character structure from that in other countries. These acquired characteristics which make a German acceptable to his compatriots at home render him a misfit in his relations with members of other nations whose values differ markedly from his own. Despite the fact that he feels inwardly harmonious and self-satisfied when at home, he is poorly adapted for handling the problems of daily life when abroad. In the same way the German governments in the past, while fulfilling the demands and ideals of the citizenry at home, have been ill attuned to the thought-processes of other nations in the Western world. If every other country in the world were similar to Germany— authoritarian in principle, sanctioning aggression, belittling the dignity and worth of individual life—Germany would not seem the misfit she does today. It is now of paramount interest to those nations who are taking the responsibility for the building of world peace to see to it that Germany shall somehow “change her spots.” In purely sociological terms, non-German society is trying to mold the character of a deviant or nonconformist for the benefit of the majority of the men and women who live outside the German nation. The formation of that German character can be accounted for; it contains tendencies which are definable and recognizable. The processes by which the character is produced in the German child are understandable. Germans are not biologically different from other Europeans or from Americans. Their characteristics are only cultural; that is, they are not biologically transmitted. They need not be considered inevitable if in some way the cultural patterns which produce them can be changed. The necessary reeducation would consist of altering in some way the formation of character. The ultimate aim is easy to approve but not equally easy to accomplish. The practical difficulties as well as the theoretical ones present very formidable obstacles. There are roughly three main avenues of approach to a modification of the German character: 1) through political ideologies; 2) through changes in social and legal institutions; 3) through changes in interpersonal relations and family life. Success in the first, or in the first two, of these areas of human behavior, would be of doubtful permanence without the third. In fact, it might be impossible to achieve any success in the first or second alone without the third. American authorities are doing their best to change Germany’s political ideology. Any further propaganda for National Socialism, pan-Germanism and militarism has been outlawed. Every available form of information medium, (radio, theater, films, newspaper, magazines and books, schools) has been used to introduce a democratic point of view. But can any thoroughgoing reversal of German political thinking be accomplished if the basic German character remains untouched? If the presentday German is unreceptive to foreign doctrines because of ingrained distrust of outsiders, because of his love of orderliness and his dislike of change, because of his long-standing pride in things German, can outsiders hope to affect his attitudes much, or at all? Perhaps there is a distinction between older Germans, with their psychological rigidity, and the student group, who are different in receptivity and pliability despite their common backgrounds in training and education. The younger elements in Germany offer somewhat more hope than the older ones, though one should not underestimate the power of nationalistic emotions to nullify any non-German efforts. The change in institutions has not actually gone very far. Of course it includes restoration of universal and secret voting, competitive political parties, representative legislatures, religious and political liberties, and equal rights to women in business, professional, and political life. Such things are the bare minimum of democratic functioning as known in the United States. Little has been done, so far, to counteract the hierarchical structure of German schooling, the class differences in education, or the rigid regulations of apprenticeship. There remains the Beamtentum of the public officials who have lorded it over the population under monarchy and republic alike. There are the class distinctions within the professions, the endless classifications of rank in everyday life. Nothing has destroyed the importance of “status” in German social organization or its symbolic value in German eyes. It is still necessary to counteract the tendency to think of others in terms of either “inferior” or “superior,” to encourage Germans to think of other individuals as having equal human rights. In listing all the omissions, there is some satisfaction in knowing that the bombing of German cities had one salutary result; more than any other single factor it has tended to wipe out social and class distinctions. As the English discovered during their own Blitz, among the homeless and the afraid there is a real community of interest, regardless of class. To alter German interpersonal relations and family life is the most difficult task of all. It is of course an enormous undertaking to try to reach into the home itself and to influence the father and mother. German fathers naturally resent any attacks directed against their authoritarianism, and German mothers, afraid to risk their husbands’ wrath, are traditionally conservative. It might be possible to reach the present generation of children through their schooling and, in an indirect long-term way, influence the personal and home lives of the following generations. The father of the future might absorb the idea that he will not harm his son’s character by allowing him to love his father, or spoil the son by sparing the rod. The boys of today might be so taught that when they become fathers they will avoid the kind of training which produces children conditioned to alternating submission and aggression, anxiety over status, discipline, and cleanliness, or adolescents who are unhappy, rebellious, and destructive. It is conceivable that in two, or three, or four generations, there may be a change in the basic character formation of Germans because of outside efforts. But from knowledge of the obsessive, repetitive side of the German personality and the probability of Allied retirement from the scene before the task is completed, the chances for such a happy outcome do not seem very great. Trying to influence character formation without simultaneously working on the social milieu in which the character is to function is as futile as trying to revamp the milieu without thought for the type of personality that is to live within it. Merely to change their external world will only create intolerable conflict for Germans who maintain traditionally German values. The man who feels he is only a kleiner Mensch (little man) will be completely lost at first, and will be likely to pray for the return of those who can make decisions for him and give him convenient rules to follow. A program directed solely toward character modification would be far less promising than one which attempted positively to offer new ideologies in place of the old, and introduced new customs to replace social usages abolished because they bolstered the old hierarchical system. Changes in political ideology and social forms can in themselves produce widespread changes in thought and conduct. The ability of these changes to survive, without being overthrown or discarded, will depend on the depth of their penetration into everyday life and German acceptance of these modifications in general behavior and thinking. If acceptance is only superficial—that is, for the duration of Allied occupation—traditional behavior patterns will once more oust the alterations which are being introduced into Germany at the present time. On these grounds, the longer the occupation can be maintained (provided it has an active educational program), the better will be the chance for character modifications to survive. The American wish to see Germans converted to democracy of a strictly American type involves in all probability a dangerous misconception. American democracy was not transplanted from a foreign country; it evolved in accordance with the needs and habits of immigrants and pioneers in an undeveloped country. It would be foolhardy to expect it to be transplanted now to Europe and superimposed upon a culture which has a history and characteristics of its own, developed out of the necessities and conditions of its own past. It is foolish even to think in terms of “teaching” one culture to take on the values and standards of another, especially since the German culture is already a very old and highly developed one. It is true that some Oriental countries have adopted certain Western usages in dress and transportation; but ordinarily colonization, occupation, or commercial penetration does not profoundly change any of the philosophical or moral patterns in a culture. Efforts to force Germany to learn a new way of living and to find a new solution of her social problems are more likely to be met with resentment and defensive aggressiveness than with welcome. It is important to remember that one must first win the consent even of the conquered before one can teach them. “A cultural heritage in the long run never submits to force, but itself vanquishes force in the end.”[24] In a people with a strongly developed sense of group solidarity, such as the Germans, any attack upon the system may also be construed by each German as an attack upon himself and he will therefore build up resistance to it. This need not be taken as a prediction of inevitable failure; on the contrary, it is only a warning that whatever is done in Germany in the way of redirection, reconstruction, or reeducation must be extremely carefully planned with a view toward specific reaction to it. We are still aided by the Germans’ sense of their own failure and demoralization, which help to keep the atmosphere clear for the development of new ideologies and new institutions, but this state may not last much longer. The reeducation of Germany is exceedingly difficult but not impossible; under present conditions, however, it looks somewhat improbable. [24] Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture, New York, 1934. As discouraging evidence of its improbability, the following story by Dana A. Schmidt is quoted from the New York Times under the dateline of Munich, June 12, 1947:
Corporal punishment will be reintroduced, Dr. Alois Hundhammer, Minister of Education, announced today as a result of a poll among parents in which 60 percent of the votes were for it. There were 1,148,170 ayes and 668,3 20 nays. Each pair of parents had as many votes as they had children of elementary-school age. Munich, Nuremberg and most other towns, especially in industrial northern Bavaria, were against it, but they were outvoted by the country districts. Corporal punishment was generally abolished under the Weimar Republic, reintroduced by Hitler and again outlawed in most German states after the end of the war. Dr. Hundhammer’s predecessor in office, Dr. Franz Fendt, outlawed it here a year ago. Now Bavaria shares the distinction of authorized corporal punishment with the State of Wuertemberg-Baden, where even girl pupils may be whipped. Dr. Hundhammer, right-wing leader of the Christian Social Union, called for the poll after his disciplinary proposals had aroused indignant protest from Social Democratic and Communist leaders, and from most of the press. At that time he also expressed his disapproval of having women as principals of schools in which male teachers were employed because that “reverses the natural order of things.” At a press conference today Dr. Hundhammer explained that he would issue an ordinance specifying how often and with what boys might be beaten. The punishment will be authorized only for disciplinary reasons, he said, and not for backwardness in studies. Asked whether he thought this represented democratic progress, the Minister replied: “It is the principle of democracy to recognize the will of the majority. It has nothing to do with progress.” One reporter suggested that the decision discriminated against poor pupils, who in Germany usually attend, until the age of 14, elementary schools called Volksschulen, where whipping is allowed, while more prosperous pupils generally transfer at the age of 11 to so-called higher schools, where it is not allowed. Dr. Hundhammer pointed out that, on the other hand, higher schools have the privilege of expelling pupils. A humorist who asked whether Bavaria would seek foreign exchange to import bamboo canes was told that that had not been considered. Dr. Hundhammer has four children, of whom the two youngest are boys aged 6 and 13. The youngest has not been consulted, but the 13-year-old, who recently transferred to a higher school, told inquiring reporters that he could see no objection to an occasional whipping.Those who attempt reeducation should bear in mind certain dangers. They may be deluded by German obsequiousness into thinking that the people have really learned a new behavior pattern, whereas they may merely be following their familiar habits of obedience and acquiescence to authority. Their general passivity and cooperation with the occupation authorities has been interpreted as one of the least hopeful signs by those who would like to see signs of awakening independence and “civil courage.” There is also the danger of attempting to do too much in proportion to the available forces, thereby dispersing the efforts so widely that they will be ineffective. One of the most likely possibilities is that Americans will soon tire of what they consider “meddling” in other people’s affairs, and give in to their desires to “go home.” But they should guard against the idea that postwar Germany can be transformed overnight into a truly modern state, merely by encouraging her to change the superficial forms of her culture—the outer symptoms rather than the basic forces. In the early phase of the reeducation program, it may be sufficient merely to eradicate those institutions and those organizations which work to preserve the typical German character. But in the later, longer phases, Germany must have the time, the economic stability, and the peace of mind to develop her own form of democratic character, suited to her specific needs. In psychological terms, the hopes for eventual changes in Germany might be stated as follows: It is hoped that there will be a change in the German attitude toward parental (especially paternal) authority. It would be desirable to influence the German father to teach his children independence instead of servility. It would be desirable to demonstrate to him that he can earn the respect and love of his children, without the harshness and discipline he customarily maintains because he fears loss of status or dignity. He should be helped to see that he can afford to treat his wife as a partner of equal rank and authority in the education of their children, and to accept women in general as persons of intrinsic value, not as servants and inferiors. Measures should be introduced which will make it possible for German women to attain equal status. The effects of the traditional social stratification can be counteracted by casting doubt on one of its primary assumptions, that men are superior to women. It is necessary to strengthen the feminine and maternal elements in the German ideal, which is now overweighted with the cult of manliness. Women can be placed in all the types and levels of German schools, both as students and as teachers, and the practice of corporal punishment can be forbidden as an aid to education in the schools, in order to discredit it as an aid to training in the home. German children (as well as German adults) need to be taught to think for themselves, to doubt, to question established authorities, to develop insight into and criticize themselves. This will no doubt have to be taught through the schools. Children need to shed the compulsions of authority, and to stop believing in its infallibility. They may then feel the excitement of taking on responsibility, instead of remaining passive, insecure, and dependent on the orders of others. They know very little of the meaning of “self-expression”; until now, they have usually been content simply to find their niche in life. Germans need to learn a good deal about interpersonal relations, especially about living with their neighbors in the world. They need more sympathy, more of the ability to understand the reactions of other people. They should hear the truths about other cultures, in order to learn to appreciate the virtues as well as the defects in other people. They can well afford to have their nationalistic pride deflated. They can be taught that there are peaceful, nonviolent methods of settling quarrels and adjusting differences, without resort to rupture of relations or war. Germans need to see themselves as others see them. They should be helped to visualize authoritarian customs as they appear to men and women who have enjoyed the personal privileges of a relatively free way of life, and only then be asked to decide whether they still prefer to live under the authoritarian pattern. They are not yet really aware of the restricted, regimental life they have been leading, and, as Germans, they are unthinkingly resistant to a trial of a different method. There will undoubtedly continue to be resistance against change, regardless of whether the changes are proposed from without or from within. How to handle this resistance poses another question to the non-German. Shall it be tolerated in the interests of democratic forms of action, or is it wiser to repress it firmly and promptly? In the case of the discussion groups at Bad Homburg, for example, was it wise to have treated the older members of the group as if they had been adult Americans, asking them to reconsider their organization, leaving the decision up to them, even when it meant tacit abandonment of the younger group to them? Would it not have served the purposes of reeducation better, if the authorities had ordered the separation of the groups, or even taken the leadership temporarily into their own hands? It would appear that even with the best of intentions, Americans may have to live by the spirit rather than by the letter of democracy, in dealing with practical situations in Germany. Americans can win the attention and the good will of Germans through a sympathetic manner and a sympathetic ear, but for the good of Germany and the good of mankind, the Allies must remember to be firm in pursuing their policies. The dualism in the German character is deceptive. The self-same traits which make Germans appear to be apt students of democracy can make them our bitter opponents under different circumstances. It would be impossible for any one alive today to predict the outcome of Allied efforts in Germany. Altering an old, traditional culture has never really been tried on this scale before. The very conception is challenging. It is admittedly difficult; it may not succeed. But because it is such a necessary step in building the structure of world peace, and because the civilization that Americans prize may not survive another war, they must go ahead with their efforts, believing in success. The generations that come after will have to decide whether they were realistic planners or merely idle dreamers. * Appendices ** Appendix I: The Screening Center for German Licensees The following article originally appeared in the Information Control Intelligence Summary of the Office of Military Government for Germany (ICIS No. 43, week ending May 25, 1946), and is reprinted with permission of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department. Written in April, 1946, it is a description of the ICD Screening Center as it was then functioning, but all specific information that might have been useful to Nazis trying to confuse the examiners was deliberately omitted. The Center closed in August, 1946. *** Establishment of the Center Since November 1945, the Information Control Division has been conducting a special screening center where scientific tests and measurements are employed to insure the selection of only the most suited and reliable Germans for licenses in the critically important fields of information presentation. Since the entry of American troops into Germany, investigation of prospective Information Control licensees has been conducted by special vetters, distributed throughout the American Zone. These men interrogate applicants for licenses, check their references and then write reports of their findings and recommendations. The limitations of such screening soon become apparent. Not only are the vetters so overworked that they cannot spend the desirable amount of time investigating the most important licensees, but each vetter also has his own criteria for judging the anti-Nazism and other qualifications of candidates. As a result, there is widespread disparity among the vetting procedures of different interrogators. Thus, the establishment of a screening center with highly specialized personnel and a large reference library was indicated. Even more important in the decision for establishing the screening center was the recognition of the necessity for selecting licensees for information services who not only would be Frage bo gen-clear but who also would act as reliable and strongly positive forces in the reorientation of Germany after occupation controls are reduced. In addition, it has been found that the licensees’ attitudes and personality characteristics required study that could not be given by the vetter, who in the same day might investigate a circus-manager, a newspaper editor and a bookseller. Numerous cases demonstrated that careful investigation was required to determine the significance of affiliation in various Nazi organizations or of the extent of alleged anti-nazi activity. Only scientific procedure could establish the limit to which an individual licensee might be used (whether in policy-making or purely technical service, for example) and the extent of supervision a licensee might require. Finally, the center was also to be used for rechecking old licensees upon the presentation of new evidence against them or in cases where their activity after licensing had been doubtful. *** Organization of the Center In October and November, 1945, under the direction of the chief of intelligence for Information Control Division, Dr. David M. Levy (an outstanding American psychiatrist) in cooperation with Mr. Ernest Rott (authority on Nazi organizations and on the history of the Hitler regime, and former employee of OSS) planned and began to operate the screening center. It was found that the actual staff requirements for the center were not large: a psychiatrist, a psychologist, a political authority, and a few American and German assistants were able to run the organization. The first weeks of operation were devoted to refining procedures and techniques. New tests were added and others eliminated, order of procedure was improved and timing of tests revised. Gradually the techniques were adapted to the mentality of the candidates and to the requirements of the screening task. Two classes, of four people each, were put through the center every week, the first class arriving Sunday evening and leaving Wednesday morning, the second arriving Wednesday evening and leaving Saturday morning. By the end of April, 1946, about 125 candidates had been screened. The center was located at Bad Homburg. *** Procedures and Techniques Initial vetting in the field was continued even after the establishment of the center. But such investigations are only preliminary; all prospective licensees who are doubtful applicants as well as all those who are considered for vitally important positions, such as newspaper editing, film producing, publishing, etc., are sent to the center. A specific quota of candidates is given to the three Laender and to the Berlin Information Control branches. The candidate arrives with his dossier, the vetter’s report and recommendations, a brief life-history and his Military Government Fragebogen. He is told that the center provides the final check required for his license. Some of the candidates arrive annoyed and distrustful of the procedure, and every attempt is made to win their confidence and cooperation. Practically all candidates have expressed their satisfaction with their experience. A number have declared that they were impressed by the insight they gained into American methods and techniques and democratic procedures. As a result of the atmosphere of the place they talk freely and are usually completely cooperative. 1. THE INTELLIGENCE TEST The first evening is devoted to making the candidates feel at home in order to reduce their suspicions. The next morning a general intelligence test is administered. The results provide a basis for evaluating answers to subsequent tests. It is not assumed, for example, that a man with a comparatively low score on the intelligence test is playing “dumb” when he fails to answer certain abstract questions in the subsequent political reliability test. Conversely, a candidate who has a high score and who has difficulty with certain political or abstract questions is regarded as evasive. 2. THE RORSCHACH TEST The second test is the Rorschach test, a well known psychiatric device which provides insight into the general personality make-up and emotional adjustment of the individual. From this test it is possible to determine whether the candidate is capable of dealing with abstract and theoretical problems, whether he is adaptable in his social relationships, whether he is aggressive or passive, whether he can be relied on to pursue an independent, courageous course or whether he might be fearful and passive. Since it provides the general attitude patterns of the individual, this test is useful in predicting future trends of action. It is hardly likely, for example, that a vacillating person with little capability for dealing with abstract problems would make a very reliable newspaper editor. On the other hand, no single individual test is used by itself to classify a student; the aggregate result of all the tests provides the rating. 3. THE SENTENCE COMPLETION TEST The third test, designed to provide insight into the political attitudes of the candidates, consists of 40 completion questions, i.e., incomplete sentences to be completed by the candidate. The questions are formed so as to examine the students’ attitudes toward all kinds of political and social problems. These answers are carefully graded on a scale with seven grades ranging from strongly democratic to strongly undemocratic and including one grading of non-committal. 4. THE POLITICAL ESSAY TEST This test is used in connection with the fifth test as a basis of reference for political analysis. In the fourth test the candidate is asked to write two essays entitled: “My Feelings During the Nazi Period” and “The Collective Guilt of the German People.” These essays provide understanding of the applicant’s attitude toward national socialism and some clue to the extent of his anti-nazi orientation as well as his national feeling. 5. THE POLITICAL ANALYSIS INTERVIEW The actual political analysis is conducted by Mr. Rott, who knows the significance of membership and entrance data in various organizations and can detect contradictions, absurdities or deliberate dishonesties in Fragebogen replies. In this interview, as in all interviews, every attempt is made to avoid any procedure reminiscent of Gestapo or police measures. The candidates, almost without exception, talk freely once their confidence has been won. Mr. Rott’s broad experience is of great value in screening. A theater director, for example, who first denied having directed or produced any propaganda plays, finally admitted having directed two. This concealment itself was not so important to Mr. Rott as the fact that the applicant had been employed in Goering’s theater, where, unlike Goebbels’ establishment, it was not required that the director produce propaganda pieces. Thus, this producer-director had personally chosen to produce these propaganda plays. Although he was Fragebogen-c]ear, he was not considered sufficiently reliable to be granted a completely independent license. It was recommended, therefore, that he be allowed to work only under the supervision of a completely trustworthy licensee. 6. THE PSYCHIATRIC INTERVIEW The psychiatric interview deals with the family background and social environment of the applicant and attempts to establish the factors that have influenced his political and social attitudes and developed his personality traits. It checks on the motivations for his actions, assessing how much freedom he can be allowed and whether he can be trusted as a positive and uncompromising force. The test indicates whether the candidate has told the full truth during the political interview. In addition, it evaluates the candidate’s personality in terms of the job for which he is being considered. An example of the usefulness of the psychiatric interview was presented in the case of an editor of a prominent licensed newspaper. Although he had exhibited strong, anti-Nazi attitudes in his essays, he had supported the Nazis during the first three years of their regime. The psychiatric interview showed that he was motivated by a desire to protect the interests of the Catholic Church. To this end he had supported the Nazis with misplaced idealism. In addition, the test showed that the candidate was undiplomatic and not a good executive, although intellectually capable of newspaper work. It was recommended that he be allowed to write for the newspapers but that he not be trusted to fulfill the position of chief editor. The tests sometimes indicate that people who might ordinarily be categorically classified Black are worthy of special consideration or higher classification. A former professional army officer, a young man of 25, demonstrated that he had become completely disillusioned with Nazism and regretted having chosen the army as his profession. A study of his background and a comparison of the results of the various tests led to a recommendation that he not be blacklisted entirely but that he be allowed to work under the guidance of a licensee. As a result of the experiences with the applicants since November, 1945, it has been possible to develop criteria for recognizing pro-nazi attitudes. Thus, certain family, social and other environmental factors taken in conjunction have been shown to provide a basis for development of tendencies which would lead to opposition to Nazism, whereas other factors form a behavior pattern that usually culminates in support of fascism. These criteria were used in arriving at evaluations of test results. 7. SOCIAL BEHAVIOR More informally, the applicants are tested on their social relationship by observation of their behavior toward one another, their ability to exchange ideas without undue dogmatism and their ability to influence the opinions of others. During an informal evening session, they are asked to relate an anecdote or an experience in their lives. These experiences are usually significant because they show what the candidates consider important in their own lives and how they behave in a group. In the final test the morning before they leave, the candidates are asked to write an analysis of any one of the other candidates. Their choice of subject, ability to observe, selection of details, methods of criticism and general attitude are significant in revealing their own capacities. In addition, their compositions are useful in providing information about those students whom they analyze. 8. FINAL EVALUATION Each staff member, in the light of the tests he has administered, writes an evaluation of the various candidates. Then a final discussion of every candidate is held before the recommendation of the center is formulated. The final report is drafted by the head of the center, Dr. Bertram Schaffner, who replaced Dr. Levy as the psychiatrist. *** Application of Tests: Some Typical Cases The following case-reports illustrate how the combination of tests employed at the screening center serves to present a full understanding of the prospective licensee and enables reliable judgment of his suitability for a position. A non-Nazi ‘who is an untrustworthy opportunist. Subject is a first-rate orchestral conductor who, according to the initial vetting report, had compromised with the regime but who could be useful in reviving the musical life of a large German community. The problem for the screening center was to decide how much responsibility might be entrusted to this man. High ratings in the intelligence and political attitudes tests indicated good intellect and an understanding of political principles. The Rorschach psychological test showed him to be a disturbed and immature personality but with apparently good social adjustment and conformist thought patterns. At the social session, the subject related an anecdote revealing his cleverness in taking advantage of coincidences and his use of bribery to avoid military service. He admitted that he had accepted his first job as an orchestral conductor not because of interest in music but because he was thus enabled to avoid military service. The psychiatric interview indicated that the candidate was changeable, weak and compromising, and utilitarian in his friendships. His lack of typical German nationalist feeling was not due to contrary political views but to being self-centered. The results of political interviews were in agreement with the findings of the other tests. The subject had exhibited early resistance to National Socialism but had capitulated when offered tempting honors, such as guest conductorships in Paris and Barcelona. The tests showed clearly that the candidate was opportunistic, unprincipled, conformist and weak. He was classified Grey and allowed to conduct as guest conductor but was not permitted to hold a position as regular conductor. In addition, selection of his orchestral programs will have to be under the supervision of a completely trustworthy licensee. A woman who belonged to four Nazi organizations. An Information Control detachment was eager to employ this woman to direct a series of women’s programs on the radio. Because of her membership in four minor Nazi organizations, it was feared that it would be necessary to blacklist her. The psychiatric test, however, vindicated her, and she was found to be a woman of remarkable integrity. After having been abandoned by her parents while she was still a child, she had brought up her brother and had educated herself and him. She had traveled widely, particularly in France and Italy, and had none of the typical German attitudes of nationalism or superiority. Her husband, a physician, was completely clear. She claimed to have joined Nazi organizations to protect him and to keep him from having to join. Her plans for radio programs revealed tolerance, wide knowledge and untypical German attitudes toward family life and the rearing of children. Because of her membership in the four organizations, it was impossible to classify this woman above Grey. She was not blacklisted because her psychiatric interview had shown that she could be used under supervision for the kind of work anticipated for her. An anti-Nazi who was a professional soldier. His father had been the publisher of an anti-monarchist newspaper in Bavaria, and the son had traveled in France, England and the Soviet Union to observe other ways of life. Although a lifelong loyal Catholic, he did not allow religious feelings to impair his political judgment, he was able to be objective about the Soviet Union. He had been arrested for a short time in 1933, and his newspaper business had been confiscated, although the Nazis permitted him to work on his paper until 1935, when they dismissed him for good. To “escape” from the Nazis, he then entered the army, where he became a colonel. It is known that until 1938 some Germans did consider the Wehrmacht to be a refuge from Hitlerism. This candidate is anti-militarist and anti-nationalist. At great risk he kept his son out of the Hitler Youth. He was brought up as a solitary individual and trained to think for himself. Like his father, he is a non-conformist. Although ordinarily the fact that the candidate had been a professional army officer would have disqualified him from running a publishing business, the background information discovered at the screening center showed him to be suitable for a Grey rating (acceptable to work under supervision). *** Summary: Usefulness of the Tests After several months of trial and refinement, the tests at the screening center have shown themselves to be useful in several respects: a. They can aid in determining the vocational capability of an individual for a particular position. b. They can determine the amount of supervision required for a prospective licensee or the extent to which he can be trusted to work on his own. c. They can be used to select the people best suited for jobs requiring policy-making or leadership of public opinion. d. They provide a more intensive investigation than the first vetting and lead to the discovery of additional facts and background material. e. They overcome the limitations of the Fragebogen approach by investigating the individual licensee’s basic attitudes and motivations and by judging the actual significance of Nazi or military affiliations or, on the other hand, of victimization at the hands of the Nazis. f. They establish a scientific basis for uniformity of judgment in screening. *** Conclusion In a concentrated three days, prospective licensees for important positions which will have influence in determining the future orientation of Germany, are subjected to tests which determine not merely whether they were members of the Nazi party or whether they might be called anti-nazis, but whether they will be useful, reliable forces for a democratic future in Germany. Although the center has been set up for the screening of Information services candidates, the general theory and techniques of the center can be applied to screening for general government purposes. It would be possible, for example, to screen high German public officials to determine whether or not they can be relied upon in the future when American supervision has been reduced to a minimum. Although the small staff of the center at present makes it impossible to screen large numbers, it is believed that the more the Germans are screened, the better the aims of the occupation may be carried out. Should the screening center be adapted to screening German public leaders, priorities could be set up by which Germans in charge of selecting other types of officials might be screened. In this way American occupation officials could be sure that a carefully screened superintendent of city schools, for example, would have, even without American supervision, the motivations and attitudes which would insure his appointing the same kinds of school teachers that Americans would choose to instruct German children. The success of the center has been such that Information Control branches in the Laender and in Berlin have long lists of candidates to send to the center in order to check on the local vetting. After several months of operation, screening procedures have been refined to the point that the success of the method is now demonstrably clear in determining the reliability of applicants. ** Appendix II: The “Incomplete Sentence” Test 1. The National Socialists came into power in 1933 because 1. If every nation were composed of people of the same race, the same religion, and the same culture, 2. The authoritarian state has the advantage that............. 3. Hitler’s peace policy failed because......... 4. In the future, German youth should be organized under the leadership of 5. The good points in the program of the National Socialist party are 6. The anti-semitism of the Nazis was.......... 7. The marriage of persons of different nationalities is........... 8. The greatest man in Germany’s history.............. 1. o. The task of a free Germany in Europe is 11. The democratic countries were not prepared for war because 12. Hatred of the Jews was due to 13. Present-day measures for the control of the press should consist of..... 14. In the new Germany, that kind of art and literature should be allowed which 15. The weaknesses of democracy are 16. Demonstration of maternal affection by kissing and huggingis..... 17. That Germany had lost the war, became apparent in the year 18. The revolt of a young man against his father is 19. The reason for the weakness of the German underground was 20. The bombing of open cities in Germany was 21. A mother, who interferes when a father is punishing his son, is 22. The reconstruction of the Wehrmacht should 23. If the world were completely indoctrinated with German culture, 24. If a father does not use corporal punishment on his children, 25. To keep the church from abusing its power, 26. A third World War will come, unless 27. Horst Wessel was a man who 28. Germany would never have lost the war if 29. Anti-Semitism can best be solved by 30. If a father does not inspire respect (Ehrfurcht) in his son, 31. The right of women to vote, take up professions, or in general to earn their own living, 32. The best way to protect oneself during the Nazi period was 33. In the new Germany, people who were put in concentration camps because of their resistance to Hitler should........................................................... 34. Actors and writers, who were members of the Nazi Party, should 35. For young men, military service 36. The creation of Lebens borne{1} shows ... 37. When a man expresses his political opinion, his wife should 38. Nazi profiteers, who are now under arrest, should 39. In connection with the second World War, all those should feel guilty who 40. The occupation of Germany should last {1} Lebensborne was the name given originally to rest-camps for SS officers, to which young girls were sent for the pleasure of the officers. Later the name came to be applied to the camps where these girls bore their children. Generally the girls returned to their homes, leaving the babies to be raised in the Lebensborne by the Nazi state. ** Appendix III: The German Attitude Scale The statements used in the German Attitude Scale were prepared in 1944 by a subcommittee of psychologists at the request of the “Round Table Conference on Germany after the War.” The subcommittee consisted of Morris Krugman, chairman, Henry Hansburg, Mason Altrowitz, Morris Spevack, and Simon Tulchin. A complete discussion of the construction and use of the German Attitude Scale among German prisoners-of-war in this country is being published separately by its authors. The Round Table Conference permitted the author of this book to take the Scale to Germany, where German reactions to it were carefully measured by the Opinion Surveys Section of the Information Control Division of American Military Government. The German Attitude Scale is here given in full, together with the tabular results obtained. [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-1.jpg]] [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-2.jpg]] [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-3.jpg]] [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-4.jpg]] [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-5.jpg]] [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-6.jpg]] [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-7.jpg]] [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-8.jpg]] [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-9.jpg]] [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-10.jpg]] [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-11.jpg]] [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-12.jpg]] [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-13.jpg]] [[b-s-bertram-schaffner-father-land-14.jpg]] ** Appendix IV: Typical Histories and Statements of Candidates Examined at the ICD Screening Center in 1946 *** Classification “White A”